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UNITED STATES 

NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION 

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20555-0001 
April 13,  2011 
Mr. Michael J. Pacilio 
President and Chief Nuclear Officer 
Exelon Nuclear 
4300 Winfield Road 
Warrenville,IL  60555 
SUBJECT: 	 BRAIDWOOD STATION, UNITS 1 AND 2 AND BYRON STATION, UNIT 
NOS. 1 AND 2 - ISSUANCE OF AMENDMENTS RE: CHANGES TO 
TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION SECTIONS 5.5.9, "STEAM GENERATOR (SG) 
PROGRAM" AND 5.6.9 "STEAM GENERATOR (SG) TUBE INSPECTION 
REPORT."  (TAC NOS. ME5198, ME5199, ME5200, AND ME5201) 
Dear Mr.  Pacilio: 
The U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC, the Commission) has issued the enclosed 
Amendment No. J 66  to Facility Operating License No. NPF-72 and Amendment No. 166  to 
Facility Operating License No. NPF-77 for the, Braidwood Station, Units 1 and 2, respectively, 
and Amendment No.  172 to Facility Operating License No. NPF-37 and Amendment No.I72 
to Facility Operating License No. NPF-66 for the Byron Station, Unit Nos. 1 and 2, respectively. 
The amendments are in response to your application dated December 14,2010. 
A copy of the Safety Evaluation is also enclosed.  The Notice of Issuance will be included in the 
Commission's biweekly Federal Register notice. 
~Yra---
Nicholas J. DiFrancesco, Project Manager 
Plant Licensing Branch 111-2 
Division of Operating Reactor Licensing 
Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation 
Docket Nos. STN 50-456, STN 50-457, 
STN 50-454 and STN 50-455 
Enclosures: 
1.  Amendment No.  166  to NPF-72 
2.  Amendment No. 166  to NPF-77 
3.  Amendment No.  172  to NPF-37 
4.  Amendment No.  172  to NPF-66 
5.  Safety Evaluation 
cc w/encls:  Distribution via Listserv UNITED STATES 

NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION 

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20555-0001 
EXELON GENERATION COMPANY, LLC 
DOCKET NO. STN 50-456 
BRAIDWOOD STATION, UNIT 1 
AMENDMENT TO FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE 
Amendment NO.166 
License No. NPF-72 
1. 	 The U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (the Commission) has found that: 
A. 	 The application for amendment by Exelon Generation Company, LLC (the 
licensee) dated December 14, 2010, complies with the standards and 
requirements of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended (the Act) and the 
Commission's rules and regulations set forth in 10 CFR Chapter I; 
B. 	 The facility will operate in conformity with the application, the provisions of the 
Act, and the rules and regulations of the Commission; 
C. 	 There is reasonable assurance (i) that the activities authorized by this 
amendment can be conducted without endangering the health and safety of the 
public, and (ii) that such activities will be conducted in compliance with the 
Commission's regulations; 
D. 	 The issuance of this amendment will not be inimical to the common defense and 
security or to the health and safety of the public; and 
E. 	 The issuance of this amendment is in accordance with 10 CFR Part 51  of the 
Commission's regulations and all applicable requirements have been satisfied. 
2. 	 Accordingly, the license is amended by changes to the Technical Specifications as 
indicated in the attachment to this license amendment, and paragraph 2.C.(2) of Facility 
Operating License No. NPF-72 is hereby amended to read as follows: (2) 	 Technical Specifications 
The Technical Specifications contained in Appendix A as revised through 
Amendment No. 166  and the Environmental Protection Plan contained·in 
Appendix B, both of which are attached hereto, are hereby incorporated into this 
license.  The licensee shall operate the facility in accordance with the Technical 
Specifications and the Environmental Protection Plan. 
3. 	 This license amendment is effective as of the date of its issuance and shall be 
implemented within 30 days of the date of issuance. 
FOR THE NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION 
!WJ 
Robert D. Carlson, Chief 
Plant licensing Branch 111-2 
Division of Operating Reactor Licensing 
Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation 
Attachment:  Changes to the Technical 
Specifications and Facility Operating License 
Date of Issuance:  Anril 13  201lo
L  , UNITED STATES 

NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION 

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20555-0001 
EXELON GENERATION COMPANY, LLC 
DOCKET NO. STN 50-457 
BRAIDWOOD STATION, UNIT 2 
AMENDMENT TO FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE 
Amendment NO.166 
License No. NPF-77 
1. 	 The U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (the Commission) has found that: 
A. 	 The application for amendment by Exelon Generation Company, LLC (the 
licensee) dated December 14, 2010, complies with the standards and 
requirements of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended (the Act) and the 
Commission's rules and regulations set forth in 10 CFR Chapter I; 
B. 	 The facility will operate in conformity with the application, the provisions of the 
Act, and the rules and regulations of the Commission; 
C. 	 There is reasonable assurance (i) that the activities authorized by this 
amendment can be conducted without endangering the health and safety of the 
public, and (ii) that such activities will be conducted in compliance with the 
Commission'S regulations; 
D. 	 The issuance of this amendment will not be inimical to the common defense and 
security or to the health and safety of the public; and 
E. 	 The issuance of this amendment is in accordance with 10 CFR Part 51  of the 
Commission's regulations and all applicable requirements have been satisfied. 
2. 	 Accordingly, the license is amended by changes to the Technical Specifications as 
indicated in the attachment to this license amendment, and paragraph 2.C.(2) of Facility 
Operating License No. NPF-77 is hereby amended to read as follows: -2­
(2) 	 Technical Specifications 
The Technical Specifications contained in Appendix A as revised through 
Amendment No. 166  and the Environmental Protection Plan contained in 
Appendix B, both of which were attached to License No. NPF-72, dated 
July 2, 	1987, are hereby incorporated into this license.  The licensee shall operate 
the facility in accordance with the Technical Specifications and the Environmental 
Protection Plan. 
3. 	 This license amendment is effective as of the date if its issuance and shall be 
implemented within 30 days of the date of issuance. 
FOR THE NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION 
Robert D. Carlson, Chief 
Plant Licensing Branch 111-2 
Division of Operating Reactor licensing 
Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation 
Attachment:  Changes to the Technical 
Specifications and Facility Operating License 
Date of Issuance: April 13,  2011 ATTACHMENT TO LICENSE AMENDMENT NOS.166  AND 166 
FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE NOS. NPF-72 AND NPF-77 
DOCKET NOS. STN 50-456 AND STN 50-457 
Replace the following pages of the Facility Operating Licenses and Appendix "A" Technical 
Specifications with the attached pages.  The revised pages are identified by amendment number 
and contain marginal lines indicating the areas of change. 
Remove 
License NPF-72  License NPF-72 
Page 3  Page 3 
License NPF-77  License NPF-77 
Page 3  Page 3 
TSs  TSs 
5.5-8  5.5-8 
5.5-9  5.5-9 
5.5-10  5.5-10 
5.6-7  5.6-7 -3­
(3) 	 . Exelon Generation Company, pursuant to the Act and 10 CFR Parts 30, 
40 and 70, to receive, possess,·and use at any time any byproduct, 
source and special nuclear material as sealed neutron sources for reactor 
startup, sealed sources for reactor instrumentation and radiation 
monitoring equipment calibration, and as fission detectors in amounts as 
required; 
(4) 	 Exelon Generation Company, pursuant to the Act and 10 CFR Parts 30, 
40 and 70, to receive, possess, and use in amounts as required any 
byproduct, source or special nuclear material without restriction to 
chemical or physical form, for sample analYSis or instrument calibration or 
associated with radioactive apparatus or components; and 
(5) 	 Exelon Generation Company, pursuant to the Act and 10 CFR Parts 30, 
40 and 70. to possess, but not separate. such byproduct and special 
nuclear materials as may be produced by the operation of the facility. 
C. 	 The license shall be deemed to contain and is subject to the conditions specified 
in the Commission's regulations set forth in 10 CFR Chapter I and is subject to 
all applicable provisions of the Act and to the rules, regulations and orders of the 
Commission now or hereafter in effect; and is subject to the additional conditions 
specified or incorporated below: 
(1) 	 Maximum Power Level 
The licensee is authorized to operate the facility at reactor core power 
levels is not in excess of 3586.6 megawatts thermal (100 percent rated 
power) in accordance with the conditions specified herein and other items 
identified in Attachment 1 to this license.  The items identified in 
Attachment 1 to this license shall be completed as specified. 
Attachment 1 is hereby incorporated into this license. 
(2) 	 Technical Specifications 
The Technical Specifications contained in Appendix A as revised through 
Amendment No.166, and the Environmental Protection Plan contained in 
Appendix B, both of which are attached hereto, are hereby incorporated 
into this license.  The licensee shall operate the facility in accordance with 
the Technical Specifications and the Environmental Protection Plan. 
(3) 	 Emergency Planning 
In the event that the NRC finds that the lack of progress in completion of 
the procedures in the Federal Emergency Management Agency's final 
rule, 44 CFR Part 350, is an indication that a major substantive problem 
exists in achieving or maintaining an adequate state of emergency 
preparedness, the prOVisions of 10 CFR Section 50.54(s)(2) will apply. 
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material as sealed neutron sources for reactor startup, sealed sources for 
reactor instrumentation and radiation monitoring equipment calibration, 
and as fission detectors in amounts as required; 
(4) 	 Exelon Generation Company, LLC pursuant to the Act and 10 CFR Parts 
30, 40 and 70, to receive, possess, and use in amounts are required any 
byproduct, source or special nuclear material without restriction to 
chemical or physical form, for sample analysis or instrument calibration or 
associated with radioactive apparatus or components; and 
(5) 	 Exelon Generation Company, LLC, pursuant to the Act and 10 CFR Parts 
30, 40 and 70. to possess, but not separate, such byproduct and special 
nuclear materials as may be produced by the operation of  the facility. 
C. 	 The license shall be deemed to contain and is subject to the conditions specified 
in the Commission's regulations set forth in 10 CFR Chapter I and is subject to 
all applicable provisions of the Act and to the rules, regulations and orders of the 
Commission now or hereafter in effect; and is subject to the additional conditions 
specified or incorporated below: 
(1) 	 Maximum Power Level 
The licensee is authorized to operate the facility at reactor core power 
levels is not in excess of 3586.6 megawatts thermal (100 percent rated 
power) in accordance with the conditions specified herein and other items 
identified in Attachment 1 to this license.  The items identified in 
Attachment 1 to this license shall be completed as specified. 
Attachment 1 is hereby incorporated into this license. 
(2) 	 Technical Specifications 
The Technical Specifications contained in Appendix A as revised through 
Amendment No. 166, and the Environmental Protection Plan contained in 
Appendix S, both ot which are attached to License No. NPF-72, dated 
July 2,  1987. are hereby incorporated into this license.  The licensee shall 
operate the facility in accordance with the Technical SpeCifications and 
the Environmental Protection Plan. 
(3) 	 Emergency Planning 
In the event that the NRC finds that the lack of progress in completion of 
the procedures in the Federal Emergency Management Agency's final 
rule, 44 CFR Part 350, is an indication that a major substantive problem 
exists in achieving or maintaining an adequate state of emergency 
preparedness, the provisions of 10 CFR Section 50.54(s)(2} will apply. 
Amendment No.  166 Programs  and  Manuals 
5.5 
5.5  Programs  and  Manuals 
5.5.9  Steam  Generator  (SG)  Program  (continued) 
2. 	 Accident  induced  leakage  performance  criterion:  The 
primary  to  secondary  accident  induced  leakage  rate for 
any  design  basis  accident,  other  than  a  SG  tube 
rupture,  shall  not  exceed  the  leakage  rate  assumed  in 
the  accident  analysis  in  terms  of  total  leakage  rate 
for  all  SGs  and  leakage  rate for  an  individual  SG. 
Leakage  is not  to  exceed  a total  of  1 gpm  for  all  SGs. 
3. 	 The  operational  LEAKAGE  performance  criteria is 
specified  in  LCO  3.4.13,  "RCS  Operational  LEAKAGE." 
c. 	 Provisions  for  SG  tube  repair criteria. 
1. 	 Tubes  found  by  inservice  inspection  to  contain  flaws 
in  a non-sleeved  region  with  a depth  equal  to or 
exceeding  40%  of  the  nominal  wall  thickness  shall  be 
plugged  or  repaired.  The  following  alternate tube 
repair criteria shall  be  applied  as  an  alternative to 
the  40%  depth  based  criteria: 
For  Unit  2 during  Refueling  Outage  15  and  the 
subsequent  operating  cycle,  tubes  with  service­
induced  flaws  located  greater than  16.95  inches 
below 	the  top  of  the  tubesheet  do  not  require
plugging  or  repair.  Tubes  with  service-induced 
flaws 	located  in  the  portion  of  the  tube  from  the 
top  of the  tubesheet  to  16.95  inches  below  the 
top  of  the  tubesheet  shall  be  plugged  or  repaired 
upon  detection. 
2. 	 Sleeves  found  by  inservice inspection  to  contain  flaws 
with  a depth  equal  to or  exceeding  the  following 
percentages  of  the  nominal  sleeve wall  thickness  shall 
be  plugged: 
i. 	 For  Unit  2 only,  TIG  welded  sleeves  (per  TS 
5.5.9.f.2.i):  32% 
3. 	 Tubes  with  a flaw  in  a sleeve  to  tube  joint that 
occurs  in  the  sleeve or  in  the  original  tube  wall  of 
the  joint shall  be  plugged. 
BRAIDWOOD  UNITS  1 &2  5.5 - 8 	 Amendment  166 Programs  and  Manuals 
5.5 
5.5  Programs  and  Manuals 
5.5.9  Steam  Generator  (SG)  Program  (continued) 
d.  Provisions  for  SG  tube  inspections.  Periodic  SG  tube 
inspections  shall  be  performed.  The  number  and  portions  of 
the  tubes  inspected  and  methods  of  inspection  shall  be 
performed  with  the  objective of detecting  flaws  of  any  type
(e.g.,  volumetric  flaws,  axial  and  circumferential  cracks) 
that may  be  present  along  the  length  of  the  tube,  from  the 
tube-to-tubesheet weld  at the  tube  inlet to  the  tube-to­
tubesheet  weld  at the  tube  outlet,  and  that may  satisfy the 
applicable  tube  repair criteria.  For  Unit  2 during 
Refueling  Outage  15  and  the  subsequent  operating  cycle, 
portions  of  the  tube  below  16.95  inches  from  the  top  of the 
tubesheet  are  excluded  from  this  requirement. 
The  tube-to-tubesheet  weld  is not  part  of  the  tube.  In 
addition  to  meeting  the  requirements  of d.1,  d.2,  and  d.3 
below,  the  inspection  scope,  inspection  methods,  and 
inspection  intervals shall  be  such  as  to  ensure  that  SG  tube 
integrity is maintained  until  the  next  SG  inspection.  An 
assessment  of degradati on  shall  be  performed  to  determ-j ne 
the  type  and  location  of  flaws  to  which  the  tubes  may  be 
susceptible  and,  based  on  this assessment,  to determine 
which  inspection  methods  need  to  be  employed  and  at what 
locations. 
1. 	 Inspect  100%  of the  tubes  in  each  SG  during  the  first 
refueling  outage  following  SG  replacement. 
2. 	 Inspect  100%  of the  Unit  1 tubes  at sequential  periods 
of  144,  108,  72,  and,  thereafter,  60  effective full 
power 	months.  The  first sequential  period  shall  be 
considered  to  begin  after the first inservice 
inspection  of  the  SGs.  In  addition,  inspect  50%  of 
the  tubes  by  the  refueling  outage  nearest  the  midpoint
of  the  period  and  the  remaining  50%  by  the  refueling 
outage  nea rest the  end  of  the  peri od.  No  SG  shall 
operate  for  more  than  72  effective full  power  months 
or  three  refueling  outages  (whichever  is less)  without 
being 	inspected. 
Inspect  100%  of  the  Unit  2 tubes  at sequential  periods 
of  120,  90,  and,  thereafter,  60  effective full  power
months.  The  first sequential  period  shall  be 
consi dered  to  begi n after the  f-j rst i nservi ce 
inspection  of  the  SGs.  In  addition,  inspect  50%  of 
the  tubes  by  the  refuel i ng  outage  nea rest the  mi dpo-j nt 
of  the  period  and  the  remaining  50%  by  the  refueling 
outage  nearest  the  end  of  the  period.  No  SG  shall 
operate  for  more  than  48  effective full  power  months 
or  two  refueling  outages  (whichever  is less) without 
being 	inspected. 
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5.5 
5.5  Programs  and  Manuals 
5.5.9  Steam  Generator  (SG)  Program  (continued) 

3.  For  Unit  I, if crack  indications  are  found  in  any  SG 
tube, 	then  the  next  inspection  for  each  SG  for  the 
degradation  mechanism  that caused  the  crack  indication 
shall 	not  exceed  24  effective full  power  months  or  one 
refueling  outage  (whichever  is less).  For  Unit  2 
during  Refueling  Outage  15  and  the  subsequent
operating  cycle,  if crack  indications are  found  in  any
SG  tube  from  16.95  inches  below  the  top  of  the 
tubesheet  on  the  hot  leg  side to  16.95  inches  below 
the  top  of  the  tubesheet  on  the  cold  leg  side,  then 
the  next  inspection  for  each  SG  for  the degradation 
mechanism  that caused  the crack  indication  shall  not 
exceed  24  effective full  power  months  or  one  refueling 
outage  (whichever  is less). 

If definitive information,  such  as  from  examination  of 

a pulled  tube,  diagnostic  non-destructive  testing,  or 
engineering  evaluation  indicates that a crack-like 
indication  is not  associated  with  a crack(s),  then  the 
indication  need  not  be  treated  as  a crack. 
e. 	 Provisions  for  monitoring  operational  primary  to  secondary
LEAKAGE. 
f. 	 Provisions  for  SG  tube  repair methods.  Steam  generator  tube 
repa i r  methods  sha 11  provi de  the  means  to  reestab  1i sh  the 
RCS  pressure  boundary  integrity of  SG  tubes  without  removing
the  tube  from  service.  For  the  purposes  of  these 
Specifications,  tube  plugging  is not  a  repair. 
1. 	 There  are  no  approved  tube  repair  methods  for  the 
Unit  1 SGs. 
2.  All  acceptable  repair methods  for  the  Unit  2 SGs  are 
listed below. 
i. 	 TIG  welded  sleeving  as  described  in  ABB 
Combustion  Engineering  Inc.,  Technical  Reports:
Licensing  Report  CEN-621  P,  Revision  00,
"Commonwea lth  Edi son  Byron  and  Brai dwood  Unit  1 
and  2 Steam  Generators  Tube  Repair  Using  Leak 
Ti ght 	Sl eeves,  FINAL  REPORT,"  Apri 1 1995;  and 
Licensing  Report  CEN-627-P,  "Operating
Performance  of  the  ABB  CENO  Steam  Generator  Tube 
Sleeve  for  Use  at Corrmonwealth  Edison  Byron  and 
Braidwood  Units  1 and  2,"  January  1996;  subject 
to  the  limitations  and  restrictions as  noted  by
the  NRC  Staff. 
BRAIDWOOD  UNITS  1 &2  5.5 - 10 	 Amendment  166 
5.6 
Report-i ng  Requi rements 
5.6  Reporting  Requirements 
5.6.9  Steam  Generator  (SG)  Tube  Inspection  Report  (continued) 
j.  For  Unit  2 following  completion  of  an  inspection  performed  -in 
Refueling  Outage  15  (and  any  inspections  performed  in  the  I 
subsequent  operating  cycle),  the  operational  primary  to 
secondary  leakage  rate observed  (greater than  three gallons 
per  day)  in  each  steam  generator  (if it is not  practical  to 
assign  the  leakage  to  an  individual  steam  generator,  the 
enti re  pr-imary  to  secondary  leakage  should  be  conservatively
assumed  to  be  from  one  steam  generator)  during  the  cycle 
preceding  the  inspection  which  is the  subject of  the  report, 
and 
k.  For  Unit  2 following  completion  of  an  inspection  performed  in 
Refueling  Outage  15  (and  any  inspections  performed  in  the  I 
subsequent  operating  cycle),  the  calculated  accident  induced 
leakage  rate  from  the  portion  of  the  tubes  below  16.95  inches 
from  the  top  of the  tubesheet  for  the  most  limiting accident 
in  the  most  l-illlit-ing  SG.  In  addition,  if the  calculated 
accident  induced  leakage  rate  from  the most  limiting  accident 
is less than  3.11  times  the  maximum  operational  primary  to 
secondary  leakage  rate,  the  report  should  describe  how  it was 
determined,  and 
1.  For  Unit  2 following  completion  of  an  inspection  performed  in 
Refueling  Outage  15  (and  any  inspections  performed  in  the  I 
subsequent  operating  cycle),  the  results of  monitoring  for 
tube  axial  displacement  (slippage).  If slippage  is 
discovered,  the  implications  of  the  discovery  and  corrective 
action  shall  be  provided. 
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NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION 

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20555-0001 

EXELON GENERATION COMPANY, LLC 
DOCKET NO. STN 50-454 
BYRON STATION, UNIT NO.1 
AMENDMENT TO FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE 
Amendment No. 172 
License No. NPF-37 
1. 	 The Nuclear Regulatory Commission (the Commission) has found that: 
A. 	 The application for amendment by Exelon Generation Company, LLC (the 
licensee) dated December 14, 2010, complies with the standards and 
requirements of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended (the Act) and the 
Commission's rules and regulations set forth in  10 CFR Chapter I; 
B. 	 The facility will operate in conformity with the application, the provisions of the 
Act, and the rules and regulations of the Commission; 
C. 	 There is reasonable assurance (i) that the activities authorized by this 
amendment can be conducted without endangering the health and safety of the 
public, and (ii) that such activities will be conducted in compliance with the 
Commission's regulations; 
D. 	 The issuance of this amendment will not be inimical to the common defense and 
security or to the health and safety of the public; and 
E. 	 The issuance of this amendment is in accordance with 10 CFR Part 51  of the 
Commission'S regulations and all applicable requirements have been satisfied. 
2. 	 Accordingly, the license is amended by changes to the Technical Specifications as 
indicated in the attachment to this license amendment, and paragraph 2.C.(2) of Facility 
Operating License No. NPF-37 is hereby amended to read as follows: - 2­
(2) 	 Technical Specifications 
The Technical Specifications contained in Appendix Aas revised through 
Amendment No.  172  and the Environmental Protection Plan contained in 
Appendix B,  both of which are attached hereto, are hereby incorporated into this 
license.  The licensee shall operate the facility in accordance with the Technical 
Specifications and the Environmental Protection Plan. 
3. 	 This license amendment is effective as of the date of its issuance and shall be 
implemented prior to conducting the steam generator inspections required by Technical 
SpeCifications 5.5.9 for Byron Station, Unit No.2, fall 2011  refueling outage (B2R16). 
FOR THE NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION 
Robert D. Carlson, Chief 
Plant Licensing Branch 111-2 
Division of Operating Reactor Licensing 
Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation 
Attachment:  Changes to the Technical 
Specifications and Facility Operating License 
Date of Issuance: April 13,  2011 UNITED STATES 

NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION 

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20555-0001 
EXELON GENERATION COMPANY, LLC 
DOCKET NO. STN 50-455 
BYRON STATION, UNIT NO.2 
AMENDMENT TO FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE 
Amendment No. 172 
License No. NPF-66 
1. 	 The Nuclear Regulatory Commission (the Commission) has found that: 
A. 	 The application for amendment by Exelon Generation Company, LLC (the 
licensee) dated December 14,2010, complies with the standards and 
requirements of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended (the Act) and the 
Commission's rules and regulations set forth in 10 CFR Chapter I; 
B. 	 The facility will operate in conformity with the application, the provisions of the 
Act, and the rules and regulations of the Commission; 
C. 	 There is reasonable assurance (i) that the activities authorized by this 
amendment can be conducted without endangering the health and safety of the 
public, and (ii) that such activities will be conducted in compliance with the 
Commission'S regulations; 
D. 	 The issuance of this amendment will not be inimical to the common defense and 
security or to the health and safety of the public; and 
E. 	 The issuance of this amendment is in accordance with 10 CFR Part 51  of the 
Commission's regulations and all applicable requirements have been satisfied. 
2. 	 Accordingly, the license is amended by changes to the Technical Specifications as 
indicated in the attachment to this license amendment, and paragraph 2.C.(2) of Facility 
Operating License No. NPF-66 is hereby amended to read as follows: - 2 ­
(2) 	 Technical Specifications and Environmental Protection Plan 
The Technical Specifications contained in Appendix A (NUREG-1113), as revised 
through Amendment No.  172  and the Environmental Protection Plan contained 
in Appendix B, both of which were attached to License No. NPF-37, dated 
February 14, 1985, are hereby incorporated into this license.  The licensee shall 
operate the facility in accordance with the Technical Specifications and the 
Environmental Protection Plan. 
3. 	 This license amendment is effective as of the date of its issuance and shall be 
implemented prior to conducting the steam generator inspections required by Technical 
Specifications 5.5.9 for Byron Station, Unit No.2, fall 2011  refueling outage (B2R16). 
FOR THE NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION 
Robert D. Carlson, Chief 
Plant Licensing Branch 111-2 
Division of Operating Reactor Licensing 
Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation 
Attachment:  Changes to the Technical 
Specifications and Facility Operating License 
Date of Issuance:  April 13,  2011 ATTACHMENT TO LICENSE AMENDMENT NOS. 172  AND 172 
FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE NOS. NPF-37 AND NPF-66 
DOCKET NOS. STN 50454 AND STN 50-455 
Replace the following pages of the Facility Operating License and Appendix "At! Technical 
Specifications with the attached pages.  The revised pages are identified by amendment number 
and contain marginal lines indicating the areas of change. 
Remove 
License NPF-37  License NPF-37 
Page 3  Page 3 
License NPF-66  License NPF-66 
Page 3  Page 3 
TSs  TSs 
5.5-8  5.5-8 
5.5-9  5.5-9 
5.5-10  5.5-10 
5.6-7  5.6-7 ~3-
(4) 	 Pursuant to the Act and 10 CFR Parts 30, 40 and 70, to receive, possess, 
and use in amounts as required any byproduct, source or special nuclear 
material without restriction to chemical or physical form. for sample 
analysis or instrument calibration or associated with radioactive 
apparatus or components; and 
(5) 	 Pursuant to the Act and 10 CFR Parts 30, 40 and 70, to possess, but not 
separate, such byproduct and special nuclear materials as may be 
produced by the operation of the facility. 
C. 	 This license shall be deemed to contain and is subject to the conditions specified 
in the Commission's regulation set forth in 10 CFR Chapter I and is subject to all 
applicable provisions of the Act and to the rules, regulations, and orders of  the 
Commission now or hereafter in effect; and is subject to the additional conditions 
specified or incorporated below: 
(1) 	 Maximum Power level 
The licensee is authorized to operate the facility at reactor core power 
levels not in excess of 3586.6 megawatts thermal (100 percent power) in 
accordance with the conditions specified herein. 
(2) 	 Technical Specifications 
The Technical Specifications contained in Appendix A as revised through 
Amendment N0172  And the Environmental Protection Plan contained in 
Appendix B, both of which are attached hereto, are hereby incorporated 
into this license.  The licensee shall operate the facility in accordance with 
the Technical Specifications and the Environmental Protection Plan. 
(3) 	 Deleted. 
(4) 	 Deleted. 
(5) 	 Deleted. 
(6) 	 The licensee shall implement and maintain in effect all provisions of  the 
approved fire protection program as described in the licensee's Fire 
Protection Report, and as approved in the SER dated February 1987 
through Supplement No.8, subject to the following provision: 
The licensee may make changes to the approved fire protection 
program without prior approval of the Commission only if those 
changes would not adversely affect the ability to achieve and 
maintain safe shutdown in the event of a fire. 
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(3) 	 Pursuant to the Act and 10 CFR Parts 30. 40 and 70, to receive, possess, 
and use at any time any byproduct, source and special nuclear material 
as sealed neutron sources for reactor startup, sealed sources for reactor 
instrumentation and radiation monitoring equipment calibration, and as 
fission detectors in amounts as required; 
(4) 	 Pursuant to the Act and 10 CFR Parts 30, 40 and 70, to receive, possess, 
and use in amounts as required any byproduct, source or special nuclear 
material without restriction to chemical or physical form, for sample 
analysis or instrument calibration or associated with radioactive 
apparatus or components; and 
(5) 	 Pursuant to the Act and 10 CFR Parts 30, 40 and 70, to possess, but not 
separate, such byproduct and special nuclear materials as may be 
produced by the operation of the facility. 
C. 	 This license shall be deemed to contain and is subject to the conditions specified 
in the Commission's regulation set forth in 10 CFR Chapter I and is subject to all 
applicable provisions of  the Act and to the rules, regulations, and orders of  the 
Commission now or hereafter in effect; and is subject to the additional conditions 
speCified or incorporated below: 
(1) 	 Maximum Power Level 
The licensee is authorized to operate the facility at reactor core power 
levels not in excess of 3586.6 megawatts thermal (100 percent rated 
power) in accordance with the conditions specified herein. 
(2) 	 Technical SpeCifications and Environmental Protection Plan 
The Technical Specifications cort~i"ed in Appendix A (NUREG-1113), as 
revised through Amendment No.l72 , and the Environmental Protection 
Plan contained in Appendix B, both of which were attached to License 
No. NPF-37, dated February 14, 1985. are hereby incorporated into this 
license.  The licensee shall operate the facility in accordance with the 
Technical Specifications and the Environmental Protection Plan. 
(3) 	 Deleted. 
(4) 	 Deleted. 
(5) 	 Deleted. 
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5.5.9  Steam  Generator  (SG)  Program  (continued) 
2.  Accident  induced  leakage  performance  criterion:  The 
primary  to  secondary  accident  induced  leakage  rate for 
any  design  basis  accident,  other than  a SG  tube 
rupture,  shall  not  exceed  the  leakage  rate assumed  in 
the  accident  analysis  in  terms  of  total  leakage  rate 
for  all  SGs  and  leakage  rate for  an  individual  SG. 
Leakage  is not  to  exceed  a total  of  1 gpm  for  all  SGs. 
3.  The  operational  LEAKAGE  performance  criteria is 
specified  in  LCD  3.4.13,  "ReS  Operational  LEAKAGE." 
c.  Provisions  for  SG  tube  repair  criteria. 
1.  Tubes  found  by  inservice  inspection  to  contain  flaws 
in  a non-sleeved  region  with  a depth  equal  to  or 
exceeding  40%  of  the  nominal  wall  thickness  shall  be 
plugged  or  repaired.  The  following  alternate tube 
repair criteria shall  be  applied  as  an  alternative to 
the  40%  depth  based  criteria: 
For  Unit  2 during  Refueling  Outage  16  and  the 
subsequent  operating  cycle,  tubes  with  service­
induced  fl aws  located  greater than  16.95  -i nches 
below  the  top  of  the  tubesheet  do  not  require
plugging  or  repair.  Tubes  with  service-induced 
flaws  located  in  the  portion  of  the  tube  from 
the  top  of  the  tubesheet  to  16.95  inches  below 
the  top  of  the  tubesheet  shall  be  plugged  or 
repaired  upon  detection. 
2.  Sleeves  found  by  inservice  -inspection  to  conta-in  flaws 
with  a depth  equal  to or  exceeding  the  following 
percentages  of  the  nominal  sleeve  wall  thickness  shall 
be  plugged: 
i.  For  Unit  2 only,  TIG  welded  sleeves  (per  TS 
5.5.9.f.2.i):  32% 
3.  Tubes  with  a flaw  in  a sleeve  to  tube  joint that 
occurs  in  the  sleeve  or  in  the  original  tube  wall  of 
the  joint shall  be  plugged. 
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5.5.9  Steam  Generator  (SG)  Program  (continued) 
d.  Provisions  for  SG  tube  inspections.  Periodic  SG  tube 
i nspecti ons  shall  be  performed.  The  number  and  porti ons  of 
the  tubes  inspected  and  methods  of  inspection  shall  be 
performed  with  the  objective of detecting  flaws  of  any  type
(e.g.,  volumetric  flaws,  axial  and  circumferential  cracks) 
that may  be  present  along  the  length  of  the  tube,  from  the 
tube-to-tubesheet  weld  at the  tube  inlet to  the  tube-to­
tubesheet  weld  at the  tube  outlet,  and  that may  satisfy the 
applicable tube  repair criteria.  For  Unit  2 during
Refuen ng  Outage  16  and  the  subsequent  operating  cycle, 
portions  of  the  tube  below  16.95  inches  from  the  top  of  the 
tubesheet  are  excluded  from  thi s  requ"j rement. 
The  tube-to-tubesheet weld  is not  part of  the  tube.  In 
addition  to meeting  the  requirements  of  d.1,  d.2,  and  d.3 
below,  the  inspection  scope,  inspection  methods,  and 
inspection  intervals shall  be  such  as  to ensure  that  SG  tube 
integrity is maintained  until  the  next  SG  inspection.  An 
assessment  of  degradation  shall  be  performed  to determine 
the  type  and  location  of  flaws  to  which  the  tubes  may  be 
susceptible  and,  based  on  this assessment,  to  determine 
which  inspection  methods  need  to  be  employed  and  at what 
locations. 
1.  Inspect  100%  of  the  tubes  in  each  SG  during  the first 
refueling  outage  following  SG  replacement. 
2..  Inspect  100%  of  the  Unit  1 tubes  at sequential  periods 
of 144,  108,  72,  and,  thereafter,  60  effective full 
power  months.  The  first sequential  period  shall  be 
considered  to  begin  after the  first inservice 
inspection  of  the  SGs.  In  addition,  inspect  50%  of 
the tubes  by  the  refuel"ing  outage  nearest the  midpoint
of  the  period  and  the  remaining  50%  by  the  refueling 
outage  nearest  the  end  of  the  period.  No  SG  shall 
operate  for  more  than  72  effective full  power  months 
or  three  refueling outages  (whichever  is less)  without 
being  inspected. 
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5.5.9 	 Steam  Generator  (SG)  Program  (continued) 
Inspect  100%  of  the  Unit  2 tubes  at sequential  periods 
of  20,  90,  and,  thereafter,  60  effective full  power
months.  The  first sequential  period  shall  be 
considered  to  begin  after the  first inservice 
inspection  of  the  SGs. 	 In  addition,  inspect  50%  of 
the  tubes  by  the  refueling  outage  nearest  the  midpoint
of  the  period  and  the  remaining  50%  by  the  refueling 
outage  nearest  the  end 	of  the  period.  No  SG  shall 
operate  for  more  than  48 	effective full  power  months 
or  two  refueling  outages 	(whichever  is less)  without 
being  inspected. 
3.  For  Unit  1,  if crack  indications are  found  in  any  SG 
tube,  then  the  next  inspection  for  each  SG  for  the 
degradation  mechanism  that  caused  the  crack  indication 
shall  not  exceed  24  effective full  power  months  or  one 
refueling  outage  (whichever  is less).  For  Unit  2 
dur-j ng  Refuel i ng  Outage 	16  and  the  subsequent
operating  cycle,  if crack  indications  are  found  in  any
SG  tube  from  16.95  inches  below  the  top  of the 
tubesheet  on  the  hot  leg 	side to 16.95  inches  below 
the  top  of the  tubesheet 	on  the  cold  leg  side,  then 
the  next  inspection  for 	each  SG  for  the  degradation 
mechanism  that caused  the  crack  indication  shall  not 
exceed  24  effective full 	power  months  or  one  refueling 
outage  (whichever  is less). 

If definitive information,  such  as  from  examination  of 

a pulled  tube,  diagnostic  non-destructive  testing,  or 

engineering  evaluation  indicates  that a crack-like 

indication  is not  associated  with  a crack(s),  then  the 

indication  need  not  be 	treated as  a crack. 
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5.6.9  Steam  Generator  (SG)  Tube  Inspection  Report  (continued) 
j.  For  Unit  2 following  completion  of  an  inspection  performed  in 
Refueling  Outage  16  (and  any  inspections  performed  in  the 
subsequent  operati ng  cycl e),  the  operati onal  pr-jmary  to 
secondary  leakage  rate observed  (greater than  three gallons 
per  day)  in  each  steam  generator  (if it is not  practical  to 
assign  the  leakage  to  an  individual  steam  generator,  the 
entire primary  to  secondary  leakage  should  be  conservatively
assumed  to  be  from  one  steam  generator)  during  the  cycle 
preceding  the  inspection  which  is the  subject  of  the  report, 
and 
k.  For  Unit  2 following  completion  of  an  inspection  performed  in 
Refue1  i ng  Outage  16  (and  any  i nspecti ons  performed  -j n the 
subsequent  operating  cycle),  the  calculated accident  induced 
leakage  rate  from  the  portion  of  the  tubes  below  16.95  inches 
from  the  top  of  the  tubesheet  for  the  most  limiting accident 
in  the  most  limiting  SG.  In  addition,  if the  calculated 
accident  induced  leakage  rate  from  the  most  limiting  accident 
is less than  3.11  times  the  maximum  operational  primary  to 
secondary  leakage  rate,  the  report  should  describe  how  it was 
determined,  and 
1.  For  Unit  2 following  completion  of  an  inspection  performed  in 
Refuel"ing  Outage  16  (and  any  inspections  performed  in  the 
subsequent  operating  cycle),  the  results of  monitoring  for 
tube  axial  displacement  (slippage).  If slippage  is 
discovered,  the  implications  of  the  discovery  and  corrective 
action  shall  be  provided. 
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WASHINGTON, D.C. 20555-0001 
SAFETY EVALUATION BYTHE OFFICE OF NUCLEAR REACTOR REGULATION 
RELATED TO AMENDMENT NO.  166  TO FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE NO. NPF-72, 
AMENDMENT NO.  166  TO FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE NO. NPF-77, 
AMENDMENT NO.  172  TO FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE NO. NPF-37, 
AND AMENDMENT NO. 172  TO FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE NO. NPF-66 
EXELON GENERATION COMPANY, LLC 
BRAIDWOOD STATION, UNITS 1 AND 2 
BYRON STATION, UNIT NOS. 1 AND  2 
DOCKET NOS. STN 50-456, STN 50-457, 
STN 50-454. AND STN 50-455. 
1.0  INTRODUCTION 
By letter to the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC, the Commission), dated December 14, 
2010, Exelon Generation Company, LLC (the licensee), submitted a license amendment request 
to revise the technical specifications (TS) of Braidwood, Units 1 and 2 and Byron Stations, Unit 
Nos. 1 and 2.  The request proposed changes to the inspection scope and repair requirements 
of TS section 5.5.9, "Steam Generator (SG) Program" and to the reporting requirements of TS 
section 5.6.9, "Steam Generator (SG) Tube Inspection Report."  The proposed changes would 
establish alternate repair criteria for portions of the SG tubes within the tubesheet of the 
Braidwood Unit 2 and Byron Unit 2, Model D5 SGs.  The proposed changes would be applicable 
to Braidwood Unit 2 during Refueling Outage 15 (Spring 2011) and to Byron Unit 2 during 
Refueling Outage 16 (Fall 2011), and their respective subsequent operating cycles.  The 
proposed changes would establish temporary alternate repair criteria for portions of the 
Braidwood Unit 2 and Byron Unit 2 SG tubes within the tubesheet, and would replace similar, 
existing criteria that were used during the previous refueling outages (Fall 2009 - Braidwood Unit 
2,  Spring 2010 - Byron Unit 2).  Because Braidwood and Byron Stations, Units 1 and 2, have 
common TSs, the licensee docketed the amendment request for all four units. 
2.0  BACKGROUND 
Braidwood Unit 2 and Byron Unit 2 have four Model D5 SGs each, which were designed and 
fabricated by Westinghouse.  There are 4,570 thermally treated Alloy 600 (Alloy 600TT) tubes in 
each SG, each with an outside diameter of 0.750 inches and a nominal wall thickness of 0.043 
inches.  The tubes are hydraulically expanded for the full depth of the 21-inch thick tubesheet 
and are welded to the tubesheet at each tube end.  Until the fall of 2004, no instances of stress - 2 ­
corrosion cracking (SCC) affecting the tubesheet region of Alloy 600TT tubing had been 
reported at any nuclear power plants in the United States (U.S.). 
In the fall of 2004, crack-like indications were found in tubes in the tubesheet region of Catawba 
Nuclear Station Unit 2 (Catawba), which has Westinghouse Model D5 SGs.  Like Braidwood 
Unit 2 and Byron Unit 2, the Catawba SGs use Alloy 600TT tubing that is hydraulically expanded 
against the tubesheet.  The crack-like indications at Catawba were found in a tube 
overexpansion (OXP), in the tack expansion region, and near the tube-to-tubesheet (TITS) weld. 
An OXP is created when the tube is expanded into a tubesheet bore hole that is not perfectly 
round.  These out-of-round conditions were created during tubesheet drilling, by conditions such 
as drill bit wandering or chip gouging.  The approximately 1-inch long tack expansion is made at 
each tube end and facilitates performing the TITS weld, which is made prior to the hydraulic 
expansion of the tube over the full tubesheet depth.  Since the initial findings at Catawba in the 
fall of 2004, other nuclear plants have found crack-like indications in tubes within the tubesheet 
as well.  These plants include Braidwood Unit 2,  Byron Unit 2, Comanche Peak Unit 2,  Surry 
Unit 2, Vogtle Unit 1, and Wolf Creek Unit 1.  Most of the indications were found in the tack 
expansion region near the tube-end welds and were a mixture of axial and circumferential 
primary water stress corrosion cracking. 
On February 21,2006, Wolf Creek Nuclear Operating Corporation (WCNOC), the licensee for 
Wolf Creek Generating Station, submitted a limiting amendment request (LAR) that would 
permanently limit the scope of inspections required for tubes within the tubesheet (Reference 2). 
The LAR was based on an analysis performed by Westinghouse that provided a technical basis 
for permanently limiting the scope of inspections required for tubes within the tubesheet.  After 
three requests for additional information (RAls) and several meetings with WCNOC, the NRC 
staff informed WCNOC during a phone call on January 3, 2008, that it had not provided 
sufficient information to allow the NRC staff to review and approve the permanent LAR. 
WCNOC withdrew the LAR by letter dated February 14, 2008 (Reference 3).  Other plants had 
submitted permanent LARs similar to that for Wolf Creek prior to 2008, which also were 
subsequently withdrawn.  In a letter dated February 28, 2008 (Reference 4), the NRC staff 
identified the specific issues that needed to be addressed to support any future request for a 
permanent amendment, which included, but were not limited to, thermal expansion coefficients, 
crevice pressure assumptions, uncertainty models, acceptance standards for probabilistic 
assessment, and leakage resistance. 
After withdrawal of the initial round of permanent LARs submitted prior to 2008, the licensees 
and their contractor, Westinghouse, worked with the NRC staff to address the issues posed in 
Reference 4.  The NRC and industry held public meetings (References 5,  6,  and 7) and phone 
calls to discuss resolution of these issues.  The permanent LAR received from Braidwood Unit 2 
and Byron Unit 2 on June 24,2009 (Reference 8),  resolved the issues identified by the NRC 
staff in Reference 4 but raised an additional technical issue that prevented approval of the 
permanent LAR.  Responses to additional NRC staff RAls were supplied in References 9,  10, 
and 11. and the licensee modified its June 24, 2009 LAR (via Reference 12) to apply during 
Braidwood Unit 2 during Refueling Outage 14 (Fall 2009) and the subsequent operating cycle, 
and to Byron Unit 2 during Refueling Outage 15 (Spring 2010) and the subsequent operating 
cycle, instead of the permanent change originally requested. -3­
The NRC staff approved the revised amendment in Reference 12.  The accompanying safety 
evaluation (SE) concluded that the NRC staff did not have sufficient information to determine 
whether the tubesheet bore displacement eccentricity had been addressed in a conservative 
fashion and, thus, the NRC staff did not have an adequate basis to approve a permanent H* 
amendment at that time.  The NRC staff further concluded that despite any potential non­
conservatism in the calculated H* distance that may have been associated with the eccentricity 
issue, there was sufficient conservatism embodied in the proposed H* distance to ensure for at 
least one operating cycle (one fuel cycle) that tube structural and leakage integrity would be 
maintained with structural safety margins consistent with the design basis and with leakage 
integrity within assumptions employed in the licensing basis accident analyses, without undue 
risk to public health and safety. 
Subsequent analyses by industry to address the NRC staff concerns revealed that tubesheet 
bore eccentricity did not have a significant bearing on the outcome of the H* analyses.  However, 
these analyses also revealed a significant shortcoming in how displacements from the 3-D finite 
element model of the lower SG assembly were being applied to the TITS interaction model, 
which was based on thick shell equations.  The industry developed a new TITS interaction 
model to address this shortcoming and the H* analyses were updated accordingly.  This more 
recent background is discussed in more detail as part of the NRC staff technical evaluation in 
Section 4.0 of this SE.  Details of these more recent analyses became available for NRC staff 
review too late to support applications for a permanent H* amendment in the spring or fall of 
2011.  For this reason, the subject amendment request by the licensee is for an interim H* 
amendment, applicable to Braidwood Unit 2 during refueling outage (RFO) 15 (Spring 2011) and 
to Byron Unit 2 during RFO 16 (Fall 2011), and their respective subsequent operating cycles. 
3.0  REGULATORY EVALUATION 
In Title 10 of the Code ofFederal Regulations (10 CFR) 50.36 'Technical specifications", the 
requirements related to the content of the TSs are established.  Pursuant to  10 CFR 50.36, TSs 
are required to include items in the following five categories related to station operation: (1) 
safety limits, limiting safety system settings, and limiting control settings; (2) limiting conditions 
for operation; (3) surveillance requirements; (4) design features; and (5) administrative controls. 
The rule does not specify the particular requirements to be included in a plant's TS.  In 10 CFR 
50.36(c)(5), administrative controls are, "the provisions relating to organization and 
management, procedures, recordkeeping, review and audit, and reporting necessary to assure 
the operation of the facility in a safe manner."  Programs established by the licensee, including 
the SG program, are listed in the administrative controls section of the TS to operate the facility 
in a safe manner.  For Braidwood Unit 2 and Byron Unit 2, the requirements for performing SG 
tube inspections and repair are in TS 5.5.9, while the requirements for reporting the SG tube 
inspections and repair are in TS 5.6.9. 
The TSs for all pressurized water reactor (PWR) plants require that an SG program be 
established and implemented to ensure that SG tube integrity is maintained.  For Braidwood 
Unit 2 and Byron Unit 2, SG tube integrity is maintained by meeting the performance criteria 
specified TS 5.5.9.b for structural and leakage integrity, consistent with the plant design and 
licensing basis.  Technical specification 5.5.9.a, requires that a condition monitoring assessment 
be performed during each outage in which the SG tubes are inspected, to confirm that the 
performance criteria are being met.  Technical specification 5.5.9.d, includes provisions 
regarding the scope, frequency, and methods of SG tube inspections.  These provisions require - 4 ­
that the inspections be performed with the objective of detecting flaws of any type that may be 
present along the length of a tube, from the TITS weld at the tube inlet to the TITS weld at the 
tube outlet, and that may satisfy the applicable tube repair criteria.  The applicable tube repair 
criteria, specified in TS 5.5.9.c., are that tubes found during inservice inspection to contain flaws 
with a depth equal to or exceeding 40 percent of the nominal wall thickness shall be plugged, 
unless the tubes are permitted to remain in service through application of the alternate repair 
criteria provided in TS 5.5.9.c.1. 
The SG tubes are part of the reactor coolant pressure boundary (RCPB) and isolate fission 
products in the primary coolant from the secondary coolant.  For the purposes of this safety 
evaluation, SG tube integrity means that the tubes are capable of performing this safety function 
in accordance with the plant design and licensing basis.  The General Oesign Criteria (GOC) in 
Appendix A to 10 CFR Part 50 provide regulatory requirements, which are applicable to 
Braidwood Unit 2 and Byron Unit 2, and state that the RCPB shall have "an extremely low 
probability of abnormal leakage ... and of gross rupture" (GOC 14), "shall be designed with 
sufficient margin" (GOC 15 and 31), shall be of "the highest quality standards practical" 
(GOC 30), and shall be designed to permit "periodic inspection and testing ...  to assess ... 
structural and leaktight integrity" (GOC 32).  The licensee discusses compliance with each of 
these GOC for the Braidwood Unit 2 and Byron Unit 2 in Section 3.1  of the Updated Final Safety 
Analysis Report (UFSAR).  To this end, 10 CFR 50.55a specifies that components which are 
part of the RCPB must meet the requirements for Class 1 components in Section III of the 
American Society of Mechanical Engineers Boiler and Pressure Vessel Code (ASME Code), 
except as provided in 10 CFR 50.55a(c)(2), (3), and (4).  Section 50.55a further requires that 
throughout the service life of PWR facilities (Braidwood Unit 2 and Byron Unit 2), ASME Code 
Class 1 components meet the Section XI  requirements of the ASME Code to the extent 
practical, except for design and access provisions, and pre-service examination requirements. 
This requirement includes the inspection and repair criteria of Section XI of the ASME Code. 
The Section XI requirements pertaining to in-service inspection of SG tubing are augmented by 
additional requirements in the TS. 
As part of the plant's licensing bases, applicants for PWR licenses are required to analyze the 
consequences of postulated design-basis accidents (OBA), such as a SG tube rupture and a 
main steamline break (MSLB).  These analyses consider primary-to-secondary leakage that may 
occur during these events and must show that the offsite radiological consequences do not 
exceed the applicable limits of the 10 CFR Part 50.67 accident source term, GOC 19 for control 
room operator doses (or some fraction thereof as appropriate to the accident). or the NRC­
approved licensing basis (e.g., a small fraction of these limits).  No accident analyses for 
Braidwood Unit 2 and Byron Unit 2 are being changed because of the proposed amendment 
and, thus, no radiological consequences of any accident analysiS are being changed.  The use 
of the proposed alternate repair criteria does not impact the integrity of the SG tubes, and the 
SG tubes, therefore, still meet the requirements of the GOC in Appendix A to 10 CFR Part 50. 
and the requirements for Class 1 components in Section III of the ASME Code.  The proposed 
changes maintain the accident analyses and consequences that the NRC has reviewed and 
approved for the postulated OBAs for SG tubes 
License amendment Nos. 161  and 166 are currently approved at Braidwood Unit 2 and Byron 
Unit 2, respectively, and the amendments modified TS section 5.5.9, "Steam Generator (SG) 
Program" and TS section 5.6.9, "Steam Generator (SG) Tube Inspection Report," by 
incorporating interim alternate repair criteria and associated tube inspection and reporting - 5 ­
requirements that are applicable to Braidwood Unit 2 during RFO 14 and to Byron Unit 2 during 
RFO 15, and their respective, subsequent operating cycles.  The proposed subject amendment 
maintains the same alternate repair criteria (Le., 16.95 inches below the top of the tubesheet 
(TTS», but would be applicable to Braidwood Unit 2 during RFO 15 (Spring 2011) and to Byron 
Unit 2 during RFO 16 (Fall 2011), and their respective subsequent operating cycles. 
4.0  TECHNICAL EVALUATION 
Proposed Changes to the TS 
The TSs identified in this section are based on the Braidwood Station TS.  Any differences 
between the Braidwood and Byron TSs are identified with braces, with specific Byron TS 
wording identified in brackets (e.g., " ...during {Refueling Outage 15 [Byron: Refueling Outage 
16]}"). 
TS 5.5.9 is being revised as follows (new text in underline and bold, old text strikethrough): 
5.5.9  Steam Generator (SG) Program 
c.  Provisions for SG tube repair criteria. 
1. 	 Tubes found by inservice inspection to contain flaws in a non-sleeved region 
with a depth equal to or exceeding 40% of the nominal wall thickness shall be 
plugged or repaired.  The following alternate tube repair criteria shall be 
applied as an alternative to the 40% depth based criteria: 
For Unit 2 during {Refueling Outage 15 [Byron: Refueling Outage 16]} and 
the subsequent operating cycle, tubes with service-induced flaws located 
greater than 16.95 inches below the top of the tubesheet do not require 
plugging.  Tubes with service-induced flaws located in the portion of the tube 
from the top of the tubesheet to 16.95 inches below the top of the tubesheet 
shall be plugged or repaired upon detection. 
2.  [No change/Not shown] 
3.  [No change/Not shown] 
d. 	 Provisions for SG tube inspections.  Periodic SG tube inspections shall be 
performed.  The number and portions of the tubes inspected and methods of 
inspection shall be performed with the objective of detecting flaws of any 
type (e.g., volumetric flaws, axial and circumferential cracks) that may be 
present along the length of the tube, from the tube-to-tubesheet weld at the 
tube inlet to the tube-to-tubesheet weld at the tube outlet, and that may 
satisfy the applicable tube repair criteria.  For Unit 2 during {Refueling 
Outage 15 [Byron: Refueling Outage 16]} and the subsequent operating 
cycle, portions of the tube below 16.95 inches from geIew the top of the 
tubesheet are excluded from this requirement. - 6­
The tube-to-tubesheet weld is not part of the tube.  In addition to meeting the 
requirements of d.1, d.2, and d.3 below, the inspection scope, inspection 
methods, and inspection intervals shall be such as to ensure that SG tube 
integrity is maintained until the next SG inspection.  An assessment of 
degradation shall be performed to determine the type and location of flaws to 
which the tubes may be susceptible and, based on this assessment, to determine 
which inspection methods need to be employed and at what locations. 
1.  [No change/Not shown] 
2.  [No change/Not shown] 
3.  For Unit 1, if crack indications are found in any SG tube, then the next 
inspection for each SG for the degradation mechanism that caused the 
crack indication shall not exceed 24 effective full power months or one 
refueling outage (whichever is less).  For Unit 2 during {Refueling Outage 
15 [Byron: Refueling Outage 16]} and the subsequent operating cycle, if 
crack indications are found in any SG tube from 16.95 inches below the 
top of the tubesheet on the hot-leg side to 16.95 inches below the TITSet 
on the cold-leg side, then the next inspection for each SG for the 
degradation mechanism that caused the crack indication shall not exceed 
24 effective full power months or one refueling outage (whichever is less). 
If definitive information, such as from examination of a pulled tube, 
diagnostic non-destructive testing, or engineering evaluation indicates that 
a crack-like indication is not associated with a crack(s), then the indication 
need not be treated as a crack. 
TS 5.6.9 is being revised as follows (new text in bold): 
5.6.9  Steam Generator (SG) Tube Inspection Report 
A report shall be submitted within 180 days after the initial entry into MODE 4 
following completion of an inspection performed in accordance with TS 5.5.9, SG 
program.  The report shall include: 
a. - i. [No change/Not shown] 
j. 	 For Unit 2 following completion of an inspection performed in {Refueling Outage 
15 [Byron: Refueling Outage 16]} (and any inspections performed in the 
subsequent operating cycle), the operational primary to secondary leakage rate 
observed (greater than three gallons per day) in each steam generator (if it is not 
practical to assign the leakage to an individual SG, the entire primary to 
secondary leakage should be conservatively assumed to be from one steam 
generator) during the cycle preceding the inspection which is the subject of the 
report, 
k. 	 For Unit 2 following completion of an inspection performed in {Refueling Outage 
15 [Byron: Refueling Outage 16]} (and any inspections performed in the 
subsequent operating cycle), the calculated accident induced leakage rate from - 7 ­
the portion of the tubes below 16.95 inches from the top of the tubesheet for the 
most limiting accident in the most limiting SG.  In addition, if the calculated 
accident induced leakage rate from the most limiting accident is less than 3.11 
times the maximum operational primary to secondary leakage rate, the report 
should describe how it was determined, and 
I. 	 For Unit 2 following completion of an inspection performed in {Refueling Outage 
15 [Byron: Refueling Outage 16]} (and any inspections performed in the 
subsequent operating cycle), the results of monitoring for tube axial displacement 
(slippage).  If slippage is discovered, the implications of the discovery and 
corrective action shall be provided. 
4.1  Technical Evaluation 
The TITS joints are part of the pressure boundary between the primary and secondary systems. 
Each TITS joint consists of the tube, which is hydraulically expanded against the bore of the 
tubesheet, the TITS weld located at the tube end, and the tubesheet.  The joints were designed 
in accordance with Section III of the ASME Code as welded joints, not as friction joints.  The 
TITS welds were designed to transmit the tube end cap pressure loads, during normal operating 
and DBA conditions, from the tubes to the tubesheet with no credit taken for the friction 
developed between the hydraulically-expanded tube and the tubesheet.  The axial force which 
could produce pullout comes from the primary-to-secondary pressure differentials associated 
with normal operating and DBA conditions and is called the end cap load.  In addition, the welds 
serve to make the joints leak tight. 
This design basis is a conservative representation of how the TITS joints actually work, since it 
conservatively ignores the role of friction between the tube and tubesheet in reducing the tube 
end cap loads.  The initial hydraulic expansion of the tubes against the tubesheet produces an 
"interference fit" between the tubes and the tubesheet; thus, producing a residual contact 
pressure (RCP) between the tubes and tubesheet, which acts normally to the outer surface of 
the tubes and the inner surface of the tubesheet bore holes.  Additional contact pressure 
between the tubes and tubesheet is induced by operational conditions, as will be discussed in 
detail below.  The amount of friction force that can be developed between the outer tube surface 
and the inner surface of the tubesheet bore is a direct function of the contact pressure between 
the tube and tubesheet times the applicable coefficient of friction. 
To support the proposed TS changes, the licensee's contractor, Westinghouse, has defined a 
parameter called H* to be that distance below the top of the tubesheet over which sufficient 
frictional force, with acceptable safety margins, can be developed between each tube and the 
tubesheet, under tube end cap pressure loads associated with normal operating and design 
basis accident conditions, to prevent significant slippage or pullout of the tube from the 
tubesheet, assuming the tube is fully severed at the H* distance below the top of the tubesheet. 
For Braidwood Unit 2 and Byron Unit 2, the proposed H* distance is 16.95 inches.  Given that 
the frictional force developed in the TITS joint over the H* distance is sufficient to resist the tube 
end cap pressure loads, it is the licensee's and Westinghouse's position that the length of tubing 
between the H* distance and the TITS weld is not needed to resist any portion of the tube end 
cap pressure loads.  Thus, the licensee is proposing to change the TS to not require inspection 
of the tubes below the H* distance and to exclude tube flaws located below the H* distance 
(including flaws in the TITS weld) from the application of the TS tube repair criteria.  Under these 
changes, the TITS jOint would now be treated as a friction joint extending from the top of the - 8 ­
tubesheet to a distance below the top of the tubesheet equal to H* for purposes of evaluating the 
structural and leakage integrity of the joint. 
The regulatory standard by which the staff has evaluated the subject license amendment is that 
the amended TSs should continue to ensure that tube integrity will be maintained consistent with 
the current design basis, as defined in the UFSAR.  This includes maintaining structural safety 
margins consistent with the structural integrity performance criteria in TS 5.5.9.b.1, as discussed 
in Section 4.2.1  below.  In addition, this includes limiting the potential for accident-induced 
primary-to-secondary leakage to values that do not exceed the accident-induced leakage 
performance criteria in TS 5.5.9.b.2, which are consistent with values assumed in the UFSAR 
accident analyses.  Maintaining tube integrity in this manner ensures that the amended TS are in 
compliance with all applicable regulations.  The NRC staff evaluation of joint structural integrity 
and accident-induced leakage integrity is discussed in Sections 4.2 and 4.3 of this SE, 
respectively. 
4.2  Joint Structural Integrity 
4.2.1  Acceptance Criteria 
Westinghouse has conducted extensive analyses to establish the necessary H* distance to 
resist pullout under normal operating and DBA conditions.  The NRC staff finds that pullout is the 
structural failure mode of interest since the tubes are radially constrained against axial fishmouth 
rupture by the presence of the tubesheet.  The axial force which could produce pullout comes 
from the primary-to-secondary pressure differentials associated with normal operating and DBA 
conditions, and is called the end cap load.  Westinghouse determined the needed H* distance 
on the basis of maintaining a factor of 3 against pullout under normal operating conditions and a 
factor of 1.4 against pullout under DBA conditions.  The staff finds that these are the appropriate 
safety factors to apply to demonstrate structural integrity.  These safety factors are consistent 
with the safety factors embodied in the structural integrity performance criteria in TS 5.5.9.b.1 
and with the design basis, including the stress limit criteria in Section III of the ASME Code. 
4.2.2  3-D Finite Element Analysis 
A detailed 3-D finite element analysis (FEA) of the lower SG assembly (consisting of the lower 
portion of the SG shell, the tubesheet, the channel head, and the divider plate separating the 
hot- and cold-leg inlet plenums inside the channel head) was performed to calculate tubesheet 
displacements due to primary pressure acting on the primary face of the tubesheet and SG 
channel head, secondary pressure acting on the secondary face of the tubesheet and SG shell, 
and the temperature distribution throughout the entire lower SG assembly.  The calculated 
tubesheet displacements were used as input to the TfTS interaction analysis evaluated in 
Section 4.2.3 below. 
The tubesheet bore holes were not explicitly modeled.  Instead, the tubesheet was modeled as a 
solid structure with equivalent material property values selected such that the solid model 
exhibited the same stiffness properties as the actual perforated tubesheet. 
A number of FEA mesh enhancements in the tubesheet region have been made since the 
reference analysis (Reference 14) was performed.  The mesh near the plane of symmetry 
(perpendicular to the divider plate) was revised to permit obtaining displacements parallel to the - 9­
direction of the divider plate directly from the 3-D finite element model, for application (as 
displacement boundary conditions) to the edges of the square cell model discussed in 
Section 4.2.3.2.  The mesh near the top of the tubesheet was enhanced to accommodate high 
temperature gradients in this area during normal operating conditions.  This 3-D FEA replaces 
the 2-D axisymmetric FEA used to suppor:t H* amendment requests submitted prior to 2008. 
The staff finds that the 3-D analysis adequately addresses a concern cited by the staff in 
Reference 4 concerning the validity of the axisymmetric model to conservatively bound 
significant non-axisymmetric features of the actual tubesheets.  These non-axisymmetric 
features include the solid (non-bored) portion of the tubesheet between the hot and cold leg 
sides, and the divider plate which acts to connect the solid part of the tubesheet to the channel 
head. 
Some non-U.S. units have experienced cracks in the weld between the divider plate and the 
stub runner attachment on the bottom of the tubesheet.  Should such cracks ultimately cause 
the divider plate to become disconnected from the tubesheet, tubesheet vertical and radial 
displacements under operational conditions could be significantly increased relative to those for 
an intact divider plate weld.  Although the industry believes that there is little likelihood that 
cracks such as those seen abroad could cause a failure of the divider plate weld, the 3-D FEA 
conservatively considered both the case of an intact divider plate weld and a detached divider 
plate weld to ensure a conservative analysis.  The case of a detached divider plate weld was 
found to produce the most limiting H* values.  In the reference analyses (Reference 14), a factor 
was applied to the 3-D FEA results to account for a non-functional divider plate, based on earlier 
sensitivity studies performed with the 2-D axisymmetric FEA model of the lower SG assembly. 
The 3-D FEA model now assumes the upper 5 inches of the divider plate to be non-existent. 
The staff finds this further improves the accuracy of the 3-D FEA for the assumed condition of a 
non-functional divider plate. 
Separate 3-D FEA analyses were conducted for each loading condition considered (i.e., normal 
operating conditions, MSLB, feedwater line break (FLB)), rather than scaling unit load analyses 
to prototypic conditions as was done in analyses prior to 2008.  The staff finds that this 
addresses (corrects) a significant source of error in analyses used by applicants to support 
permanent H* amendment requests submitted prior to 2008 and which were subsequently 
withdrawn (Reference 4).  In addition, the temperature distributions throughout the lower SG 
assembly, including the tubesheet region, were calculated directly in the 3-D FEA from the 
assumed plant temperature conditions (e.g., from the assumed primary and secondary water 
temperatures) for each operating condition.  The NRC staff finds this a more realistic approach 
than the reference analysis (Reference 14), where a linear distribution of temperature was 
assumed to exist through the thickness of the tubesheet, and an adjustment factor (based on 
sensitivity analyses) was applied to the H* calculations for normal operating conditions to 
account for the actual temperature distribution in the tubesheet. 
4.2.3  TITS Interaction Model 
4.2.3.1 Thick Shell Model 
The resistance to pullout is the axial friction force developed between the expanded tube and 
the tubesheet over the H* distance.  The friction force is a function of the radial contact pressure 
between the expanded tube and the tubesheet.  In the analyses (Reference 14) for the interim 
H* amendment issued on October 16, 2009, for Braidwood Unit 2 and Byron Unit 2 (Reference - 10­
12), Westinghouse used classical thick shell equations to model the interaction effects between 
the tubes and tubesheet under various pressure and temperature conditions for purposes of 
calculating contact pressure (TITS interaction model).  Calculated displacements from the 3-D 
FEA of the lower tubesheet assembly (see section 4.2.2 above) were applied to the thick shell 
model as input to account for the increment of tubesheet bore diameter change caused by the 
primary pressure acting on the primary face of the tubesheet and SG channel head, secondary 
pressure acting on the secondary face of the tubesheet and SG shell, and the temperature 
distribution throughout the entire lower SG assembly.  However, the tubesheet bore diameter 
change from the 3-D FEA tended to be non-uniform (eccentric) around the bore circumference. 
The thick shell equations used in the TITS interaction model are axisymmetric.  Thus, the non­
uniform diameter change from the 3-D FEA had to be adjusted to an equivalent uniform value 
before it could be used as input to the TITS interaction analysis.  A 2-D, plane stress, finite 
element model was used to define a relationship for determining a uniform diameter change that 
would produce the same change to average TITS contact pressure as would the actual non­
uniform diameter changes from the 3-D finite element analyses. 
In Reference 14, Westinghouse identified a difficultly in applying this relationship to Model D5 
SGs under MSLB conditions.  In reviewing the reasons for this difficulty, the staff developed 
questions relating to the conservatism of the relationship and whether the tubesheet bore 
displacement eccentricities are sufficiently limited such as to ensure that TITS contact is 
maintained around the entire tube circumference.  This concern was applicable to all SG models 
with Alloy 600TT tubing.  However, responses to NRC staff questions provided in References 10 
and 11  did not contain sufficient information to allow the NRC staff to reach a conclusion on 
these matters and on the acceptability of a permanent H* amendment.  However, for reasons 
discussed in the staff SE in Reference 12, the NRC staff concluded that there was an adequate 
technical basis to support issuance of an interim H* amendment. 
In Reference 15, the NRC staff documented a list of questions that would need to be addressed 
satisfactorily before the staff would be able to approve a permanent H* amendment.  These 
questions related to the technical justification for the eccentricity adjustment, the distribution of 
contact pressure around the tube circumference, and a new model under development by 
Westinghouse to address the aforementioned issue encountered with the Model D5 SGs. 
On June 14 and 15,2010, the NRC staff conducted an audit at the Westinghouse Waltz Mill Site 
(Reference 16).  The purpose of the audit was to gain a better understanding of the H* analysis 
pertaining to eccentricity, to review draft responses to the NRC staff questions in Reference 15, 
and to determine which documents would need to be provided on the docket to support any 
future requests for a permanent H* amendment.  Based on the audit, including review of 
pertinent draft responses to Reference 15, the NRC staff concluded that eccentricity does not 
appear to be a Significant variable affecting either average TITS contact pressure at a given 
elevation or calculated values of H*.  The NRC staff found that average contact pressure at a 
given elevation is primarily a function of average bore diameter change at that elevation 
associated with the pressure and temperature loading of the tubesheet.  Accordingly, the NRC 
staff concluded that no adjustment of computed average bore diameter change considered in 
the thick shell model is needed to account for eccentricities computed by the 3-D FEA.  The 
material reviewed during the audit revealed that computed H* values from the reference 
analyses continued to be conservative when the eccentricity adjustment factor is not applied. - 11  ­
During the audit, Westinghouse presented preliminary details of a new TITS interaction model 
developed as an alternative to the thick shell interaction model.  This model is termed the square 
cell model and was developed in response to the difficulty encountered when applying the 
eccentricity adjustment to the Model D5 SG TITS interaction analysis under MSLB conditions 
using the thick shell model.  Early results with this model indicated significant differences 
compared to the thick shell model, irrespective of whether the eccentricity adjustment was 
applied to the thick shell model.  The square cell model revealed a fundamental problem with 
how the results of the 3-D FEA model of the lower SG assembly were being applied to the 
tubesheet bore surfaces in the thick shell model.  As discussed in Section 4.2.2 above, the 
perforated tubesheet is modeled in the 3-D FEA model as a solid plate whose material 
properties were selected such that the gross stiffness of the solid plate is equivalent to that of a 
perforated plate under the primary-to-secondary pressure acting across the thickness of the 
plate.  This approach tends to smooth out the distribution of tubesheet displacements as a 
function of radial and circumferential location in the tubesheet, and ignores local variations of the 
displacements at the actual bore locations.  These smoothed out displacements from the 
3-D FEA results were the displacements applied to the bore surface locations in the thick shell 
model.  The square cell model provides a means for post-processing the 3-D FEA results such 
as to account for localized variations of tubesheet displacement at the bore locations as part of 
TITS interaction analysis.  The square cell model was still under development at the time of the 
audit and no draft documentation of the model was available for staff review.  Although the NRC 
staff found that objectives of the new model approach appeared reasonable, the staff was 
unable to provide feedback on the details of the approach at that time.  The staff also observed 
(Reference 16) that the square cell model approach might need to be applied to the Model F, 
44F, and 51 F SGs to confirm that the analyses for these plants were conservative. 
4.2.3.2 Square Cell Model 
Documentation for the square cell model is included with the subject amendment request for an 
interim H'" at Braidwood Unit 2 and Byron Unit 2.  The square cell model is a 2-D, plane stress, 
finite element model of a single square cell of the tubesheet with a bore hole in the middle and 
each of the four sides of the cell measuring one tube pitch in length.  Displacement boundary 
conditions are applied at the edges of the cell, based on the displacement data from the 3-D 
FEA model.  The model also includes the tube cross-section inside the bore.  Displacement 
compatibility between the tube outer surface and bore inner surface is enforced except at 
locations where a gap between the tube and bore tries to occur. 
The square cell model is applied to nine different elevations, from the top to the bottom of the 
tubesheet, for each tube and loading case analyzed.  The square cell slices at each elevation 
are modeled to act independently of one another.  The TITS contact pressure results from each 
of the nine slices are used to define the contact pressure distribution from the top to the bottom 
of the tubesheet. 
The resisting force to the applied end cap load, which is developed over each incremental axial 
distance from the top of the tubesheet, is the average contact pressure over that incremental 
distance times the tubesheet bore surface area (equal to the tube outer diameter surface area) 
over the incremental axial distance times the coefficient of friction.  The NRC staff reviewed the 
coefficient of friction used in the analysis and judges it to be a reasonable lower bound 
(conservative) estimate.  The H'" distance for each tube was determined by integrating the 
incremental friction forces from the top of the tubesheet to the distance below the top of the - 12 ­
tubesheet where the friction force integral equaled the applied end cap load, times the 
appropriate safety factor as discussed in Section 4.2.1. 
The square cell model assumes as an initial condition that each tube outer surface is in contact 
with the inner surface of the tubesheet bore, at room temperature and atmospheric pressure, 
with zero RCP associated with the hydraulic expansion process. 
The NRC staff finds the assumption of zero RCP in all tubes to be a conservative assumption. 
The limiting tube locations in terms of H* were determined during the reference analysis to lie 
along the plane of symmetry perpendicular to the divider plate.  The outer edges of the square 
cell model conform to the revised mesh pattern along this plane of symmetry in the 3-D FEA 
model of the lower SG assembly, as discussed in Section 4.2.2.  Because the tubesheet bore 
holes were not explicitly modeled in the 3-D FEA, only the average displacements along each 
side of the square cell are known from the 3-D FEA.  Three different assumptions for applying 
displacement boundary conditions to the edges of the square cell model were considered, to 
allow for a range of possibilities about how local displacements might vary along the length of 
each side.  The most conservative assumption, in terms of maximizing the calculated H* 
distance, was to apply the average transverse displacement uniformly over the length of each 
edge of the square cell. 
Primary pressure acting on the inside tube surface, and crevice pressure 
1 acting on both the 
tube outside surface and tubesheet bore surface, are not modeled directly as in the case of the 
thick shell model.  Instead, the primary side (inside) of the tube is assumed to have a pressure 
equal to the primary pressure minus the crevice pressure.  Note the crevice pressure varies as a 
function of the elevation being analyzed, as discussed in Section 4.2.4. 
The NRC staff has not completed its review of the square cell model.  This review will need to be 
completed before the staff can approve a future request for a permanent H* amendment. 
However, for reasons discussed in Section 4.5, the NRC staff concludes the proposed H* 
distances will ensure for at least one operating cycle (one fuel cycle) that tube structural and 
leakage integrity will be maintained with structural safety margins consistent with the design 
basis and with leakage integrity within assumptions employed in the licensing basis accident 
analyses, without undue risk to public health and safety. 
4.2.4 Crevice Pressure Evaluation 
As discussed in an earlier footnote, the H* analyses postulate that interstitial spaces exist 
between the hydraulically expanded tubes and tubesheet bore surfaces.  These interstitial 
spaces are assumed to act as crevices between the tubes and the tubesheet bore surfaces. 
The staff finds that the assumption of crevices is conservative since the pressure inside the 
crevices acts to push against both the tube and the tubesheet bore surfaces, thus reducing 
contact pressure between the tubes and tubesheet. 
For tubes which do not contain through-wall flaws within the thickness of the tubesheet, the 
pressure inside the crevice is assumed to be equal to the secondary system pressure.  For 
tubes that contain through-wall flaws within the thickness of the tubesheet, a leak path is 
1Although the tubes are in tight contact with the tubesheet bore surfaces, surface roughness effects are 
conservatively assumed to create interstitial spaces, which are effectively crevices, between these surfaces.  See 
Section 4.2.4 for more information. - 13 ­
assumed to exist, from the primary coolant inside the tube, through the flaw, and up the crevice 
to the secondary system.  Hydraulic tests were performed on several tube specimens that were 
hydraulically expanded against tubesheet collar specimens to evaluate the distribution of the 
crevice pressure from a location where through-wall holes had been drilled into the tubes to the 
top of the crevice location.  The TITS collar specimens were instrumented at several axial 
locations to permit direct measurement of the crevice pressures.  Tests were run for both normal 
operating and MSLB pressure and temperature conditions. 
The NRC staff finds that the use of the drilled holes, rather than through-wall cracks, is 
conservative since it eliminates any pressure drop between the inside of the tube and the 
crevice at the hole location.  This maximizes the pressure in the crevice at all elevations, thus 
reducing contact pressure between the tubes and tubesheet.  The crevice pressure data from 
these tests were used to develop a crevice pressure distribution as a function of normalized 
distance between the top of the tubesheet and the H* distance below the top of the tubesheet 
where the tube is assumed to be severed.  These distributions were used to determine the 
appropriate crevice pressure for each axial slice of the TITS interaction model.  The NRC staff 
finds that this approach acceptably addresses the staff's concerns cited in Reference 4 
concerning the use of the limiting median crevice pressure value of the normal operating and 
MSLB data, respectively, for each axial slice, in previous H* analyses in support of amendment 
applications submitted prior to 2008.  The NRC staff finds the crevice pressure distributions used 
to support the current amendment request to be more realistic and more conservative than those 
used previously. 
Because the crevice pressure distribution is assumed to extend from the H* location, where 
crevice pressure is assumed to equal primary pressure, to the top of the tubesheet, where 
crevice pressure equals secondary pressure, an initial guess as to the H* location must be made 
before solving for H* using the TITS interaction model and 3-D finite element model.  The 
resulting new H* estimate becomes the initial estimate for the next H* iteration. 
4.2.5  H* Calculation Process 
The calculation of H* consists of the following steps for each loading case considered: 
1. 	 Perform initial H* estimate (mean H* estimate) using the TITS interaction and 3-D finite 
element models, assuming nominal geometric and material properties, and assuming 
that the tube is severed at the bottom of the tubesheet for purposes of defining the 
contact pressure distribution over the length of the TITS crevice.  This initial estimate did 
not consider the effect of the Poisson's contraction of the tube radius associated with 
application of the axial end cap load (see step 6 below). 
2. 	 In the reference analysis (Reference 14), a 0.3-inch adjustment was added to the initial 
H* estimate to account for uncertainty in the bottom of the tube expansion transition 
location relative to the TITS, based on an uncertainty analysis on the bottom expansion 
transition (BET) for Model F SGs, conducted by Westinghouse.  This adjustment is not 
included in the revised H* analysis of the subject amendment request, as discussed and 
evaluated in Section 4.2.5.1  if this SE. 
3. 	 In the reference analysis (Reference 14), for normal operating conditions only, an 

additional adjustment was added to the initial H* estimate to correct for the actual 
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temperature distribution in the tubesheet compared to the linear distribution assumed in 
the FEA.  This adjustment is no longer necessary, as discussed in Section 4.2.2, since 
the tubesheet temperature distributions were calculated directly in the 3-D FEA, 
supporting the current request for an interim H* amendment. 
4. 	 Steps 1 through 3 yield a so-called "mean" estimate of H*, which is deterministically 
based.  Step 4 involves a probabilistic analysis of the potential variability of H*, relative to 
the mean estimate, associated with the potential variability of key input parameters for 
the H* analyses.  This leads to a "probabilistic" estimate of H*, which includes the mean 
estimate.  The NRC staff evaluation of the probabilistic analysis is provided in Sections 
4.2.6 and 4.2.7 of this SE. 
5. 	 Add a crevice pressure adjustment to the probabilistic estimate of H* to account for the 
crevice pressure distribution that results from the tube being severed at the final H* 
value, rather than at the bottom of the tubesheet.  This step is discussed and evaluated 
in Section 4.2.5.2 of this SE. 
6. 	 This step has been added to the H* calculation process since the reference analysis, to 
support the subject interim amendment request.  This step involves adding an additional 
adjustment to the probabilistic estimate of H* to account for the Poisson contraction of 
the tube radius due to the axial end cap load acting on each tube.  This step is discussed 
and evaluated in Section 4.2.5.3 of this SE. 
4.2.5.1 Bottom of Expansion Transition (BET) Considerations 
In the reference H* analysis (Reference 14), a O.3-inch adjustment was added to the initial H* 
estimate to account for uncertainty in the BET location, relative to the top of the tubesheet, 
based on a BET uncertainty analysis for Model F SGs conducted by Westinghouse.  As 
discussed previously in Section 4.2.3, the reference analysis was based on the thick shell model 
and the results of that analysis did not indicate a loss of contact pressure at the TITS during 
normal operating procedures or steamlinebreak conditions; therefore, this adjustment for the 
BET location was necessary.  In response to NRC staff questions regarding the BET uncertainty 
analysis, Westinghouse performed an analysis (Reference 17) that showed BET locations as 
great as one inch below the TITS could be tolerated at any tube location.  Because the limiting 
calculated H* value is in the most limiting tubesheet sector, that H* value provides greater than 
one inch of margin for most other tubesheet sectors.  For those few sectors in the tubesheet 
where the local H* distance was within one inch of the maximum H* distance, Westinghouse 
showed that the contact pressure gradient was positive with increasing depth into the tubesheet, 
and therefore, an H* length reduced by one inch still met the pull out resistance requirements, 
including appropriate safety factors. 
The new analysis performed in Reference 18 has made the need for this adjustment moot, as 
the square cell model shows a loss of contact pressure at the TITS that is greater than the 
possible variation in the BET location.  The loss of contact pressure at the TITS shown in the 
square cell model (which is unrelated to BET location) is compensated for by a steeper contact 
pressure gradient than was shown previously in the thick shell model H* analysis - 15 ­
4.2.5.2 Crevice Pressure Adjustment 
As discussed in Section 4.2.5, steps 1 through 4 of the H* calculation process leading to a 
probabilistic H* estimate are performed with the assumption that the tube is severed at the 
bottom of the tubesheet for purposes of calculating the distribution of crevice pressure as a 
function of elevation.  If the tube is assumed to be severed at the initially computed H* distance 
and steps 1 through 4 repeated, a new H* may be calculated, which will be incrementally larger 
than the first estimate.  This process may be repeated until the change in H* becomes small 
(convergence).  Sensitivity analyses conducted during the reference analysis with the thick shell 
model showed that the delta between the initial H* estimate and final (converged) estimate is a 
function of the initial estimate for the tube in question.  This delta (i.e., the crevice pressure 
adjustment referred to in step 5 of Section 4.2.5) was plotted as a function of the initial H* 
estimate for the limiting loading case and tube radial location.  The NRC staff concludes this to 
be an acceptable approach where the H* estimates are based on the thick shell model; 
however, the staff has not yet reached a conclusion regarding the applicability of this adjustment 
to H* estimates that are based on the square cell model.  The staff will need to reach a 
conclusion on this point before the NRC staff can approve any request for a permanent H* 
amendment.  However, for reasons discussed in Section 4.5, the NRC staff concludes the 
proposed H* distances will ensure for at least one operating cycle (one fuel cycle) that tube 
structural and leakage integrity will be maintained with structural safety margins consistent with 
the design basis and with leakage integrity within assumptions employed in the licensing basis 
accident analyses, without undue risk to public health and safety. 
4.2.5.3 Poisson Contraction Effect 
The axial end cap load acting on each tube is equal to the primary-to-secondary pressure 
difference times the tube cross-sectional area.  For purposes of resisting tube pullout under 
normal and accident conditions, the end cap loads used in the H* analyses are based on the 
tubesheet bore diameter, which the NRC staff finds to be a conservative assumption.  The axial 
end cap load tends to stretch the tube in the axial direction, but causes a slight contraction in the 
tube radius due to the Poisson's Ratio effect.  This effect, by itself, tends to reduce the TITS 
contact pressure and, thus, to increase the H* distance. The axial end cap force is resisted by 
the axial friction force developed at the TITS joint.  Thus, the axial end cap force begins to 
decrease with increasing distance into the tubesheet, reaching zero at a location before the H* 
distance is reached.  This is because the H* distances are intended to resist pullout under the 
end cap loads with the appropriate factors of safety applied as discussed in Section 4.2.1. 
This Poisson radial contraction effect was neglected in the Reference 4 analyses, but is 
accounted for in the analyses supporting the subject amendment request.  A simplified approach 
was followed in the current license amendment request.  First, thick shell equations were used to 
estimate the reduction in contact pressure associated with application of the full end cap load, 
assuming none of this end cap load has been reacted by the tubesheet.  The TITS contact 
pressure distributions determined in Step 4 of the H* calculation process in Section 4.2.5 were 
reduced by this amount.  Second, the friction force associated with these reduced TITS contact 
pressures were integrated with distance into the tubesheet, and the length of engagement 
necessary to react one times the end cap loading (i.e., no safety factor applied) was determined. 
At this distance (termed attenuation distance by Westinghouse), the entire end cap loading was 
assumed to have been reacted by the tubesheet, and the axial load in the tube below the 
attenuation distance was assumed to be zero.  Thus, the TITS contact pressures below the - 16­
attenuation distance were assumed to be unaffected by the Poisson radial contraction effect. 
Finally, a revised H* distance was calculated, where the TITS contact pressures from Step 4 of 
Section 4.2.5 were reduced only over the attenuation distance.  The NRC staff has not 
completed its review of the applied adjustment to account for the Poisson radial contraction 
effect.  However, for reasons discussed in Section 4.5, the staff concludes the proposed H* 
distances will ensure for at least one operating cycle (one fuel cycle) that tube structural and 
leakage integrity will be maintained with structural safety margins consistent with the design 
basis and with leakage integrity within assumptions employed in the licensing basis accident 
analyses, without undue risk to public health and safety. 
4.2.6  Acceptance Standard - Probabilistic Analysis 
The purpose of the probabilistic analysis is to develop a safe H* distance that ensures with a 
probability of 0.95 that the population of tubes will retain margins against pullout consistent with 
criteria evaluated in Section 4.2.1  of this safety evaluation, assuming all tubes to be completely 
severed at their H* distance.  The NRC staff finds this probabilistic acceptance standard is 
consistent with what the staff has approved previously and is acceptable.  For example, the 
upper voltage limit for the voltage based tube repair criteria in NRC Generic Letter 95-05 
(Reference 19) employs a consistent criterion.  The NRC staff also notes that use of the 0.95 
probability criterion ensures that the probability of pullout of one or more tubes under normal 
operating conditions and conditional probability of pullout under accident conditions is well within 
tube rupture probabilities previously considered in probabilistic risk assessments (References 20 
and 21). 
In terms of the confidence level that should be attached to the 0.95 probability acceptance 
standard, it is industry practice for SG tube integrity evaluations, as embodied in industry 
guidelines, to calculate such probabilities at a 50 percent confidence level.  The NRC staff has 
been encouraging the industry to revise its guidelines to call for calculating such probabilities at 
a 95 percent confidence level when performing operational assessments and a 50 percent 
confidence level when performing condition monitoring (Reference 22).  In the meantime, the 
calculated H* distances supporting the interim amendment currently being requested have been 
evaluated at the 95 percent confidence level, as recommended by the NRC staff. 
Another issue relating to the acceptance standard for the probabilistic analysis is determining 
what population of tubes needs to be analyzed.  For accidents such as MSLB or FLB, the NRC 
staff and licensee both find that the tube population in the faulted SG is of interest, since it is the 
only SG that experiences a large increase in the primary-to-secondary pressure differential.  For 
the Model D5 SGs in the subject amendment request, MSLB is the most limiting condition and 
the H* distances referenced herein are based on 0.95 probability/95 percent confidence 
estimates for the population of tubes in anyone SG in the plant. 
Based on the above, the NRC staff concludes that the proposed H* distance in the subject 
license amendment request is based on acceptable probabilistic acceptance standards 
evaluated at acceptable confidence levels. - 17 ­
4.2.7  Probabilistic Analyses 
Sensitivity studies were conducted during the reference analyses (Reference 14) and 
demonstrated that H* was highly sensitive to the potential variability of the coefficients of thermal 
expansion (CTE) for the Alloy 600 tubing material and the SA-50a Class 2a tubesheet material. 
Given that no credit was taken in the reference H* analyses (Reference 14) for RCP associated 
with the tube hydraulic expansion process
2 the sensitivity of H* to other geometry and material 
input parameters was judged by Westinghouse to be inconsequential and were ignored, with the 
exception of Young's modulus of elasticity for the tube and tubesheet materials.  Although the 
Young's modulus parameters were included in the reference H* analyses sensitivity studies, 
these parameters were found to have a weak effect on the computed H*.  Based on its review of 
the analysis models and its engineering judgment, the staff concurs that the sensitivity studies 
adequately capture the input parameters which may significantly affect the value of H*.  This 
conclusion is based, in part, on no credit being taken for RCP during the reference H* analyses. 
These sensitivity studies were used to develop influence curves describing the change in H*, 
relative to the mean H* value estimate (see Section 4.2.5), as a function of the variability of each 
CTE parameter and Young's modulus parameter, relative to the mean values of CTE and 
Young's Modulus.  Separate influence curves were developed for each of the four input 
parameters.  The sensitivity studies showed that of the four input parameters, only the CTE 
parameters for the tube and tubesheet material had any interaction with one another.  A 
combined set of influence curves containing this interaction effect were also created. 
Two types of probabilistic analyses were performed independently in the reference analyses 
(Reference 14).  One was a simplified statistical approach utilizing a "square root of the sum of 
the squares" method and the other was a detailed Monte Carlo sampling approach.  The staffs 
review of the reference analyses relied primarily on the Monte Carlo analYSiS, which provides the 
more realistic treatment of uncertainties. 
The NRC staff reviewed the implementation of probabilistic analyses in the reference analyses 
(Reference 14) and questioned whether the H* influence curves had been conservatively 
treated.  To address this concern, the licensee submitted new H* analyses as documented in 
References 9 and 10.  These analyses made direct use of the H* influence curves in a manner 
the NRC staff finds to be acceptable. 
The revised reference analyses in References 9 and 10 divided the tubes by sector location 
within the tube bundle and all tubes were assumed to be at the location in their respective 
sectors where the initial value of H* (based on nominal values of material and geometric input 
parameters) was at its maximum value for that sector.  The H* influence curves discussed 
above, developed for the most limiting tube location in the tube bundle, were conservatively 
used for all sectors.  The revised reference analyses also addressed a question posed by the 
staff in Reference 4 concerning the appropriate way to sample material properties for the 
tubesheet, whose properties are unknown but do not vary significantly for a given SG,  in contrast 
to the tubes whose properties tend to vary much more randomly from tube to tube in a given SG. 
This issue was addressed by a staged sampling process where the tubesheet properties were 
sampled once and then held fixed, while the tube properties were sampled a number of times 
2Residual contact pressures are sensitive to variability of other input parameters. - 18­
equal to the SG tube population.  This process was repeated 10,000 times, and the maximum 
H* value from each repetition was rank ordered.  The final H* value was selected from the 
rankordering to reflect a 0.95 probability value at the desired level of confidence for a single SG 
tube population or all SG population, as appropriate.  The NRC concludes that this approach 
addresses the NRC staff question in a realistic fashion and is acceptable. 
New Monte Carlo analyses using the square cell model to evaluate the statistical variability of H* 
due to the CTE variability for the tube and tubesheet materials were not performed in support of 
the subject interim amendments.  Instead, the probabilistic analysis utilized the results of the 
Monte Carlo from the reference analyses (References 14 and 9)3, which are based on the thick 
shell TfTS interaction model, to identify CTE values for the tube and tubesheet associated with 
the probabilistic H* values near the desired rank ordering.  Tube CTE values associated with the 
high ranking order estimates are generally negative variations from the mean value whereas 
tubesheet CTE values associated with the higher ranking order estimates are generally positive 
variations from the mean value.  For the upper 10 percent of the Monte Carlo results ranking 
order, a combined uncertainty parameter, "alpha," was defined as the square root of the sum of 
the squares of the associated tube and tubesheet CTE values for each Monte Carlo sample. 
Alpha was plotted as a function of the corresponding H* estimate and separately as a function of 
rank order.  Each of these plots exhibited well defined "break lines," representing the locus of 
maximum H* estimates and maximum rank orders associated with a given values of alpha. From 
these plots, paired sets of tube and tubesheet CTE values were selected such as to maximize 
the H* estimate and to upper and lower bound the rank orders corresponding to the appropriate 
probabilistic acceptance criteria described and evaluated in Section 4.2.6.  These CTE values 
were then input to the lower SG assembly 3-D finite element model and the square cell model to 
yield probabilistic H* estimates.  These H* estimates were then plotted as a function of rank 
ordering, allowing the interpolation of H* values at the desired rank orders. 
The limiting probabilistic H* value, evaluated at the appropriate acceptance standard as 
discussed in Section 4.2.6 and with the adjustments for crevice pressure and Poisson radial 
contraction effect discussed in Section 4.2.5, is bounded by the proposed  H* value of 16.95 
inches in the subject request for an interim amendment. 
The NRC staff has not completed its evaluation of the above probabilistic analysis, which must 
be done before the staff can approve any request for a permanent H* amendment.  However, for 
reasons discussed in Section 4.5, the staff concludes the proposed H* distances will ensure for 
at least one operating cycle (one fuel cycle) that tube structural and leakage integrity will be 
maintained with structural safety margins consistent with the design basis and with leakage 
integrity within assumptions employed in the licensing basis accident analyses, without undue 
risk to public health and safety. 
3 The NRC staff notes that because the reference Monte Carlo simulation for the Model 05 SGs was based on NOP 
conditions, Westinghouse performed an additional reference Monte Carlo simulation on the Model 05 SGs using 
SLB conditions, prior to performing the rank ordering of CTE values associated with the probabilistic H* values. - 19­
4.2.B  Coefficient of Thermal Expansion 
During operation, a large part of contact pressure in a SG TITS joint is derived from the 
difference in the CTE between the tube and tubesheet.  As discussed in Section 4.2.7, the 
calculated value of H* is hjghly sensitive to the assumed values of these CTE parameters. 
However, CTE test data acquired by an NRC contractor, Argonne National Laboratory , 
suggested that CTE values may vary substantially from values listed in the ASME Code for 
design purposes.  In Reference 4, the NRC staff highlighted the need to develop a rigorous 
technical basis for the CTE values, and their potential variability, to be employed in future H* 
analyses. In response, Westinghouse had a subcontractor review the CTE data in question, 
determine the cause of the variance from the ASME Code CTE values, and provide a summary 
report (Appendix A to Reference 14).  Analysis of the CTE data in question revealed that the 
CTE variation with temperature had been developed using a polynomial fit to the raw data, over 
the full temperature range from 75 of to 1300 of.  The polynomial fit chosen resulted in mean 
CTE values that were significantly different from the ASME Code values from 75 of to about 300 
of.  When the raw data was reanalyzed using the locally weighted least squares regression 
method, the mean CTE values determined were in good agreement with the established ASME 
Code values. 
Westinghouse also formed a panel of licensee experts to review the available CTE data in open 
literature, review the ANL provided CTE data, and perform an extensive CTE testing program on 
Alloy 600 and SA-SOB steel material to supplement the existing data base.  Two additional sets 
of CTE test data (different from those addressed in the previous paragraph) had CTE offsets at 
low temperature that were not expected.  Review of the test data showed that the first test, 
conducted in a vacuum, had proceeded to a maximum temperature of 700°C, which changed 
the microstructure and the CTE of the steel during decreasing temperature conditions.  As a 
result of the altered microstructure, the CTE test data generated in the second test, conducted in 
air, was also invalidated.  As a result of the large "dead band" region and the altered 
microstructure, both data sets were excluded from the final CTE values obtained from the CTE 
testing program. 
The test program included multiple material heats to analyze chemistry influence on CTE values 
and repeat tests on the same samples were performed to analyze for test apparatus influence. 
Because the tubes are strain hardened when they are expanded into the tubesheet, strain 
hardened samples were also measured to check for strain hardening influence on CTE values. 
The data from the test program were combined with the ANL data that were found by the 
licensee to be acceptable, and with the data obtained from the open literature search.  A 
statistical analysis of the data uncertainties was performed by comparing deviations to the mean 
values obtained at the applicable temperatures.  The correlation coefficients obtained indicated 
a good fit to a normal distribution, as expected.  Finally, an evaluation of within-heat variability 
was performed due to increased data scatter at low temperatures.  The within-heat variability 
assessment determined that the increase in data scatter was a testing accuracy limitation that 
was only present at low temperature  .. 
The testing showed that the nominal ASME Code values for Alloy 600 and SA-SOB steel were 
both conservative relative to the mean values from all the available data.  Specifically, the CTE 
mean value for Alloy 600 was greater than the ASME Code value and the CTE mean value for 
SA-SOB steel was smaller than the ASME Code value.  Thus, the H* analyses utilized the ASME - 20­
Code values as mean values in the H* analyses.  The staff finds this to be conservative because 
it tends to lead to an over-prediction of the expansion of the tubesheet bore and an under­
prediction of the expansion of the tube, thereby resulting in an increase in the calculated H* 
distance.  The statistical variances of the CTE parameters from the combined data base were 
utilized in the H* probabilistic analysis. 
Based on its review of Westinghouse CTE program, the NRC  staff concludes that the CTE 
values used in the H* analyses are fully responsive to the concerns stated in Reference 4 and 
are acceptable 
4.3  Accident-induced Leakage Considerations 
Operational leakage integrity is assured by monitoring primary-to-secondary leakage relative to 
the applicable TS limiting condition of operation  limits in TS 3.4.13, "RCS Operational 
LEAKAGE."  However, it must also be demonstrated that the proposed TS changes do not 
create the potential for leakage during DBA to exceed the accident leakage performance criteria 
in TS 5.5.9.2.b.2, including the leakage values assumed in the plant licensing basis accident 
analyses. 
If a tube is assumed to contain a 100 percent through-wall flaw some distance into the 
tubesheet, a potential leak path between the primary and secondary systems is introduced 
between the hydraulically expanded tubing and the tubesheet.  The leakage path between the 
tube and tubesheet has been modeled by the licensee's contractor, Westinghouse, as a crevice 
consisting of a porous media.  Using Darcy's model for flow through a porous media, leak rate is 
proportional to differential pressure and inversely proportional to flow resistance.  Flow 
resistance is a direct function of viscosity, loss coefficient, and crevice length. 
Westinghouse performed leak tests of TITS jOint mockups to establish loss coefficient as a 
function of contact pressure.  A large amount of data scatter, however, precluded quantification 
of such a correlation.  In the absence of such a correlation, Westinghouse has developed a 
leakage factor relationship between accident induced leak rate and operational leakage rate, 
where the source of leakage is from flaws located at or below the H* distance. 
Using the Darcy model, the leakage factor for a given type accident is the product of four 
quantities.  The first quantity is the ratio of the maximum primary-to-secondary pressure 
difference during the accident divided by that for normal operating conditions. The second 
quantity is the ratio of viscosity under normal operating primary water temperature divided by 
viscosity under the accident condition primary water temperature.  The third quantity is the ratio 
of crevice length under normal operating conditions to crevice length under accident conditions. 
This ratio equals 1, provided it can be shown that positive contact pressure is maintained along 
the entire H* distance for both conditions.  The fourth quantity is the ratio of loss coefficient 
under normal operating conditions to loss coefficient under the accident condition.  Although the 
absolute value of these loss coefficients isn't known, Westinghouse has assumed that the loss 
coefficient is constant with contact pressure such that the ratio is equal to 1.  The NRC staff 
agrees that this is a conservative assumption, provided there is a positive contact pressure for 
both conditions along the entire H* distance and provided that contact pressure increases at 
each axial location along the H* distance when going from normal operating to accident 
conditions.  Both assumptions were confirmed to be valid in the original H* analyses submitted 
with Reference 14. - 21  ­
Leakage factors were calculated for design basis accidents exhibiting a significant increase in 
primary-to-secondary pressure differential, including MSLB, FLB, locked rotor, and control rod 
ejection.  The design basis FLB heat-up transient was found to exhibit the highest leakage 
factor, 3.11, meaning that it is the transient expected to result in the largest increase in leakage 
relative to normal operating conditions. 
The latest H* analyses by Westinghouse (Reference 18) did not show an increasing TiTS 
contact pressure when going from normal operating to MSLB conditions.  The new analyses 
used the revised 3-D finite element model of the lower SG assembly and the new square cell 
model, discussed in Section 4.2.3.2 of this safety evaluation.  Although TiTS contact 
pressureincreased over some sections of the tubing under SLB conditions, it decreased over 
other sections within the H* distance.  This violated the assumed precondition for assuming that 
the ratio of loss coefficient under MSLB and normal operating conditions was at least equal to 1. 
As discussed above, the large scatter of the loss coefficient versus contact pressure data 
prevented direct use of this data in applying Darcy's leakage model.  Instead, Westinghouse 
considered a number of mathematical functions that represented the potential functional 
relationship between loss coefficient and contact pressure.  For each potential functional 
relationship, Westinghouse evaluated the ratio of loss coefficient under MSLB and normal 
operating conditions, at each elevation and radial location within the tubesheet.  For each tube, 
this ratio was integrated over the length of the H* distance yielding a ratio of flow resistances for 
MSLB and normal operating conditions.  This ratio, in conjunction with the differential pressure 
and viscosity ratios, was then used to compute the ratio of leakage under MSLB and normal 
operating conditions, at each radial location within the tubesheet. 
None of the potential functional relationships between loss coefficient and contact pressure 
considered by Westinghouse resulted in a leakage ratio value exceeding the value of 3.11 
calculated for FLB.  The description of the revised 3-D FEA of the lower SG assembly and the 
square cell model was submitted to the NRC staff for evaluation, but there was insufficient time 
to review the new information in support of permanent H* amendments for the spring or fall of 
2011.  However, the staff finds that leakage is not a concern for the proposed period of the 
interim amendment for reasons discussed in Section 4.5 below. 
In connection with Amendment Nos. 161  and 166 (Le., the currently approved alternate repair 
criteria (Reference 12»  for Braidwood Unit 2 and Byron Unit 2, the licensee provided a 
commitment that described how the leakage factor would be used to satisfy TS 5.5.9.a for 
condition monitoring and TS 5.5.9.b.2 regarding performance criteria for accident induced 
leakage: 
For the  condition  monitoring  (eM)  assessment,  the  component of operational 
leakage from the prior  cycle from below the H*  distance will be multiplied by a factor 
of3. 11 and added to the total accident leakage from anyother  source and compared 
to  the allowable accident induced leakage limit.  For the operational assessment 
(DA),  the  difference  between the  allowable  accident induced leakage  and the 
accident induced leakage from sources other than the tubesheet expansion region 
will be divided by 3.11  and compared to the observed operational leakage.  An 
administrative  operational leakage  limit  will  be  established  to  not exceed the 
calculated value. - 22 ­
In the subject amendment request (Reference 1), the licensee stated the program/procedure 
changes needed to meet these commitments were completed in accordance with Amendment 
Nos. 161  and 166 and that these changes remain in place and will also apply to the subject 
license amendment.  The staff finds these previously implemented program/procedural changes 
acceptable, since they provide further assurance, in addition to the licensee's operational 
leakage monitoring processes, that accident induced SG tube leakage will not exceed values 
assumed in the licensing bases accident analyses. 
4.4  Proposed Change to TS 5.6.9, "Steam Generator Tube Inspection Report" 
The NRC staff has reviewed the proposed reporting requirements and finds that they are 
sufficient to allow the NRC staff to monitor the implementation of the proposed amendment. 
Based on this conclusion, the staff finds that the proposed reporting requirements are 
acceptable. 
4.5  Technical Bases for Interim H* Amendment 
The proposed H* value is based on the conservative assumption that all tubes in all steam 
generators are severed at the H* location.  This is a bounding, but necessary assumption for 
purposes of supporting a permanent H* amendment because the tubes will not be inspected 
below the H* distance for the remaining life of the SGs, which may range up to 30 years from 
now depending on the plant, and because the tubes are susceptible to stress corrosion cracking 
below the H* distance.  In addition, the proposed H* distance conservatively takes no credit for 
RCP associated with the tube hydraulic expansion process. 
As discussed in Sections 4.2.3.2,4.2.5.2,4.2.5.3,4.2.7, and 4.3,  the staff has not completed its 
review of certain elements of the technical basis for the proposed H* distance.  Thus, in spite of 
the significant conservatisms embodied in the proposed H* distance, the staff is unable to 
conclude at this time that the proposed H* distance is, on net, conservative from the standpoint 
of ensuring that all tubes will retain acceptable margins against pullout (i.e., structural integrity) 
and acceptable accident leakage integrity for the remaining lifetime of the steam generators, 
assuming all tubes to be severed at the H* location.  The NRC staff will need to complete its 
review of these certain elements before it can approve any request for a permanent H* 
amendment.  However, for the reasons below, the staff concludes the proposed H* distances 
will ensure for at least one operating cycle (one fuel cycle) that tube structural and leakage 
integrity will be maintained with structural safety margins consistent with the design basis and 
with leakage integrity within assumptions employed in the licensing basis accident analyses, 
without undue risk to public health and safety. 
From a fleet-wide perspective (for all Westinghouse plants with Alloy 600TT tubes), the NRC 
staff has observed from operating experience that the extent of cracking is at an early stage in 
terms of the number of tubes affected by cracking below the H* distance and the severity of 
cracks, compared to the idealized assumption that all tubes are severed at the H* distance. 
Most of these cracks occur in the lower-most one inch of tubing, which is a region of relatively 
high residual stress associated with the 1-inch tack roll expansion in that region.  Although the 
extent of cracking can be expected to increase with time, it is the NRC staff judgment based on 
experience that it will continue to be limited to a small percentage of tubes, mostly near the tube 
ends, over the next operating cycle (approximately 18 months for Braidwood Unit 2 and Byron 
Unit 2).  The NRC staff observations are based on the review of SG tube inspection reports from - 23­
throughout the PWR fleet.  These reports are reviewed and the NRC staff's conclusions are 
typically documented within a year of each SG tube inspection.  Reference 23 provides a recent 
example of such a review for Braidwood Unit 2 and Byron Unit 2 by the NRC staff. 
The NRC staff reviewed the most recent tubing inspection reports from Braidwood Unit 2 and 
Byron Unit 2, and provides a summary of relevant findings below. 
For Braidwood Unit 2, the licensee reported in Reference 23 that in RFO 13 (Spring 2008), 
331  flaw indications were found in the lower-most 1 inch of tubing, out of 18,080 hot-leg tube 
ends inspected.  These indications resulted in 16 tubes being plugged.  In Reference 24, the 
licensee reported that in RFO 14 (Fall 2009), examinations of the tubes within the tubesheet 
(30 percent of hot-legs in all SGs from TITS to 18 inches below the TITS) showed no flaw 
indications.  The only active degradation mechanisms found in the SGs were anti-vibration bar, 
pre-heater support plate, and foreign object wear, which resulted in the plugging of 6 tubes. 
For Byron Unit 2, the licensee reported in Reference 23 that in RFO 14 (Fall 2008), 65 flaw 
indications were found in the lower-most 0.5 inches of hot-leg tubing, out of 21 ,574 hot-leg and 
cOld-leg tube ends inspected.  These indications resulted in °tubes being plugged.  In 
Reference 25, the licensee reported that RFO 15 (Spring 2010), examinations of the tubes 
within the tubesheet (25 percent of hot-legs in all SGs from TTS to 18 inches below the TTS) 
showed no flaw indications.  The only active degradation mechanisms found in the SGs were 
anti-vibration bar, pre-heater support plate, and foreign object wear, which resulted in the 
plugging of 1 tube. 
The NRC staff finds the extent and severity of cracking at Braidwood Unit 2 and Byron Unit 2 to 
be limited and within the envelope of industry experience with similar units. 
The NRC staff concludes that there is sufficient conservatism embodied in the proposed H* 
distances to ensure acceptable margins against tube pullout for at least one operating cycle for 
the reasons discussed above.  The NRC staff also concludes there is reasonable assurance 
during the next operating cycle that any potential accident induced leakage will not exceed the 
technical specification performance criteria for accident induced leakage.  This reflects current 
operating experience trends that cracking below the H* distance is occurring predominantly in 
the tack roll region near the bottom of the tube.  At this location, it is the staff's judgment that the 
total resistance to primary-to-secondary leakage will be dominated by the resistance of any 
"crevice" in the roll expansion region (due to very high TITS contact pressures in this region), 
such that the leakage factors discussed in Section 4.3 will remain conservative even should 
there be a loss of TITS contact near the top of the tubesheet due to tubesheet bore eccentricity 
effects. 
4.6  Technical Conclusion 
The NRC staff has not completed its review of certain elements of the technical basis for the 
proposed H* distance and, thus, the staff does not have an adequate basis to approve a 
permanent H* amendment. 
The proposed license amendment applies to Braidwood Unit 2 during RFO 15 and to Byron 
Unit 2 during RFO 16, and their respective, subsequent operating cycles.  The staff concludes 
that there is sufficient conservatism embodied in the proposed H* distances to ensure for at - 24­
least one operating cycle (one fuel cycle) that tube structural and leakage integrity will be 
maintained with structural safety margins consistent with the design basis and with leakage 
integrity within assumptions employed in the licensing basis accident analyses, without undue 
risk to public health and safety.  Based on this finding, the staff further concludes that the 
proposed amendment meets 10 CFR 50.36 and, thus, the proposed amendment is acceptable. 
5.0  STATE CONSULTATION 
In accordance with the Commission's regulations, the Illinois State official was notified of the 
proposed issuance of the amendment.  The State official had no comments. 
6.0  ENVIRONMENTAL CONSIDERATION 
The amendments change the requirements with respect to installation or use of a facility's 
components located within the restricted area as defined in 10 CFR Part 20.  The NRC staff has 
determined that the amendments involve no significant increase in the amounts, and no 
significant change in the types, of any effluents that may be released offsite, and that there is no 
significant increase in individual or cumulative occupational radiation exposure.  The 
Commission has previously issued a proposed finding that the amendments involve no 
significant hazards consideration, and there has been no public comment on such finding (76 FR 
5617, dated February 1,2011). Accordingly, the amendments meet the eligibility criteria for 
categorical exclusion set forth in 10 CFR 51.22(c)(9).  Pursuant to 10 CFR 51.22(b) no 
environmental impact statement or environmental assessment need be prepared in connection 
with the issuance of the amendments. 
7.0  CONCLUSION 
The Commission has concluded, based on the considerations discussed above, that (1) there is 
reasonable assurance that the health and safety of the public will not be endangered by 
operation in the proposed manner, (2) there is reasonable assurance that such activities will be 
conducted in compliance with the Commission's regulations, and (3) the issuance of the one­
cycle amendments will not be inimical to the common defense and security or to the health and 
safety of the public. - 25­
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Principal Contributor:  Andrew B. Johnson 
Date of issuance:  April 13,  2011 April 13,  2011
Mr. Michael J. Pacilio 
President and Chief Nuclear Officer 
Exelon Nuclear 
4300 Winfield Road 
Warrenville, IL  60555 
SUB..IECT: 	 BRAIDWOOD STATION, UNITS 1 AND 2 AND BYRON STATION, UNIT 
NOS. 1 AND 2 - ISSUANCE OF AMENDMENTS RE: CHANGES TO 
TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION SECTIONS 5.5.9, "STEAM GENERATOR (SG) 
PROGRAM" AND 5.6.9 "STEAM GENERATOR (SG) TUBE INSPECTION 
REPORT."  (TAC NOS. ME5198, ME5199, ME5200, AND ME5201) 
Dear Mr. Pacilio: 
The U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC, the Commission) has issued the enclosed 
Amendment No.166 to Facility Operating License No. N  PF-72 and Amendment No.166 to 
Facility Operating License No. NPF-77 for the, Braidwood Station, Units 1 and 2, respectively, 
and Amendment NO.172 to Facility Operating License No. NPF-37 and Amendment NO.172 to 
Facility Operating License No. NPF-66 for the Byron Station, Unit Nos. 1 and 2, respectively. 
The amendments are in response to your application dated December 14, 2010. 
A copy of the Safety Evaluation is also enclosed.  The Notice of Issuance will be included in the 
Commission's biweekly Federal Register notice. 
Sincerely, 
lRAJ 
Nicholas J. DiFrancesco, Project Manager 
Plant Licensing Branch 111-2 
Division of Operating Reactor Licensing 
Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation 
Docket Nos. STN 50-456, STN 50-457, 
STN 50-454 and STN 50-455 
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1.  Amendment No.166 to NPF-72 
2.  Amendment No.166 to NPF-77 
3.  Amendment NO.172 to NPF-37 
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5.  Safety Evaluation 
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